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Abstract
The thesis undertakes an examination of certain Soviet
problems which upon analysis serve to support the views of
publicists such as Richard Nixon, Richard Pipes, Edward Luttwak,
Paul Nitze, and Eugene Rostow.

These experts argue that the

Soviet Union is bent on a course of world hegemony.

The

objective of the thesis is to determine if the Soviet leadership is under lateral pressure to expand.

Two propositions

underline the broad theme of the thesis: that the Soviet
Union is the de facto Russian empire, with the same concerns,
i.e. stability and Russian domination; that real arms restraint
on the part of the United States has given the Kremlin a
"window of opportunity" in which to exploit its military
superiority.

The thesis is composed of chapters examining

traditional influences on Soviet foreign behaviour, the place
of the Soviet Union in the International State system, the
internal problems of the USSR, the major external threat
[Chinal to the Soviet Union, and a final chapter on Soviet Global
strategy, tactics, and possible courses of action.

The study

may contribute to the understanding of motivating factors in
Soviet foreign behaviour in the '80s, given its military
superiority and consistent pattern of foreign behaviour, whether
Tsarist or Soviet.

It therefore follows that this study may

also contribute to alerting those who refuse to accept that the
United States and hence the West, is seriously vulnerable to
probable Soviet foreign policy options in the early '80s.

Int roduction
Given the present global situation with its recurring
crises and dislocations, there is a tendency on the part of
some to view the global order as one out of control.

This

lack of control, or agreed upon rules of procedure and
behaviour, is often considered to be the result either of a
lack of clear foreign policy objectives on the part of certain
major actors, or the result of the actors reacting "willynilly" to a series of so-called unforeseen crises.

Hence,

foreign behaviour is seen to be incrementalist in that it is
seen as a reaction to problems as they arise rather than as
the pursuit and fulfillment, over time, of a set of desired
obj ectives.
In opposition to the incrementalists we will argue
that Soviet foreign policy and behaviour have been the result
of certain concrete objectives—pursued
both Tsarist and Soviet regimes.

over time and bridging

The pursuit of these ob-

jectives has been necessitated by a series of internal and
external exigencies.

Thus, Soviet foreign behaviour is

largely an outcome of the reaction to these perceived exigencies on the part of Soviet elites.

A good deal of inter-

national behaviour is then the result of not only one nation's
interactions with others, but rather the result of behaviour
patterns and attributes within the nation itself.

Politics

J. Wilkenfeld ( e d . ) , Conflict Behaviour and Linkage
(New York: David McKay Co., 1973), p. 7.
1

In our discussion we will proceed along the lines of
a descriptive historical analysis; it is not that we are
adverse to the application of certain analytical models but
are rather cautioned by the story of Kierkegaard's man who
lived his life in abstractions--he had abstracted himself to
such an extent that one morning he woke up to find that he
had died some time ago.
The focus of this paper will be on the USSR as a
Russian empire, and how internal difficulties in maintaining
Russian domination will result in foreign policy outputs.
We will attempt to demonstrate that the Soviet government will
feel compelled, like its Tsarist predecessors, to resort 'to
external expansionism to secure the empire.
Our examination will look at the three most serious
internal exigencies, and the dominant external threat, which
threatens the domination of the "Great Russian" Slav over the
Soviet Union.

The internal problem areas are: (1) the

legitimacy crisis of the C.P.S.U.;

(2) the problem of non-

Russian minorities within the Soviet Union; and (3) increasing
Soviet-economic dislocations.
threat is posed by China.

Simultaneously, the external

The first three of these are, of

course, problems leading to what may be termed

"lateral

pressures," [see appendix], while the last exigency is direct-its ramifications challenge the internal stability of the
Soviet Union.
Before entering a discussion of our four major problem

3
areas, as cited above, we need to briefly examine (1) the
Geographical, Historical, and Cultural influences on Soviet
foreign behaviour and (2) the perspective of the elite on the
place of the USSR in the International State System.

These

factors will influence the understanding and perception which
the Soviet elite has of those pressures which we see as
leading to patterns of Soviet foreign behaviour.
Crucial to our argument is the demonstration that the
analytical components of what has been called the "New
no longer hold.

I.R."

The premises of this are:

1.

Both powers must possess nuclear arms and
must, furthermore, keep their arms at a
level to match the other side's capabilities;

2.

Both sides must accept the concept of non
use of the nuclear arms; and

3.

Military victory is useless.

Instead, we now find that the Soviets are fast approaching
a first-strike capability

and as a consequence the old notions

of brinkmanship no longer pertain.

If this is so, Americans

also will no longer be able to operate according to the precepts of "New I.R.".

Thus Rostow warns:

Many tend to dismiss the vision of nuclear
war as unthinkable. But the vision of
Soviet political coercion backed by overwhelming nuclear and conventional forces
is so far from unthinkable as to have
become a likely possibility, thanks to
the drift of American foreign and defense
policies in the post-Viet Nam period.2
Eugene V. Rostow, "The Case Against SALT II,:'
Commentary, Feb. '79, p. 23.
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Therefore the Soviets have achieved a "window of
opportunity;" hence, if a goal can best be attained through
the use of military

force, they may feel secure in pursuing

those means to that end.

[The nature of this "window," and

military capabilities of the USSR are dealt with in some
depth in Chapter II.]
We will argue, that for the Kremlin now, given its
present military superiority, not to seek actively to attenuate
its problems

(present and future) would be to mark a radical

departure in foreign behaviour whether Tsarist or Soviet.
In the post-World War II era many academic circles
argued that the use of force by either superpower against the
other or against smaller parties was doomed to failure.

This

view gained credence by the failure of American armed forces
in the Viet Nam war.
military

Washington, which had accepted that

force was ineffective and suicidal against the USSR,

drew the lesson from Viet Nam that military force would be
3
doomed to failure "in a world of aroused nationalism."
Once
this view had gained ascendancy

there was little alarm (in

official circles) over the massive Soviet arms build-up which
accelerated unabated during the seventies.

The prevalent

attitude was that all the Soviets could achieve would be a
4
"more costly plateau of impotence."
Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?,"
Commentary, April '80, p. 40

5
This air of relative nonchalance in the face of the
USSR's ever-increasing war making ability, was reinforced
by experts such as George Kennan

(widely recognized as the

Dean of U.S. Kremlin watchers) who argued that the Soviet
Union had become a status quo power.

Hence, the intentions

of Soviet leaders were viewed as basically moderate and
peaceful.
Unfortunately

for the west these views remained in

ascendency even while the USSR went about gobbling up the
old Portuguese empire, using proxy troops supplied with Soviet
arms and advisers.

The Kremlin soon demonstrated how in-

terested it was in the status quo in Angola, Ethiopia, and
Indochina.
Perhaps the most damaging effect these views had led
to, has been the acceptance in Washington of the VanceShulman school which held that "because the internal situation
of the USSR is weak, there is nothing to worry about in
Soviet behaviour.

All the evidence, however, points to the

conclusion that the weaknesses of the regime act as a powerful spur to action."

What the followers of the Vance and

Shulman school chose to overlook is that dictators in possession
of large armies and small civil success are easily tempted to
go to war.

As Kahler notes in a well-received article:

Brian Crozier, "Moscow's Strategic Speed-up for 1979,"
Soviet Analyst, Vol. 8 No. 1, 11 Jan. '79.

The greatest incentive to risk-taking
is present when the internal prospects
do not foreclose action altogether but
are bad enough to encourage a foreign
move that might aid in consolidation,
particularly when this perception is
coupled with an international setting
that can still be challenged but with
declining probability of success.6
Kahler goes on to draw the ominous parallel between 1980 and
1914; these sets of perceptions shared by the elites of
Austria-Hungary

and Germany then, could be held by the Soviet

elite today.
This paper will argue that the equation
term military optimism

of: short-

(i.e. "Window of Opportunity") plus

long-term national pessimism

(i.e. internal and external

exigencies) will add up to probable Soviet expansion in the
early 1980s.

This combination of internal and external

exigencies leading the Soviet elites to seek expansion, combined with a "window of opportunity" provides

circumstances

which are highly conducive to the traditional, historical
drive of Moscow's

expansionism.

We have approached this paper as an exercise in
strengthening the arguments of those who seek to warn us that
the Soviet Union is actively pursuing a course towards world
hegemony.
approach."

Therefore our argument is very much a "worst case
Our analysis of Soviet problems, behaviour and

intentions is thus necessarily

one-sided.

This paper will

Miles Kahler, "Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy,"
Foreign Affairs, Winter 79/80.
E.N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," op. cit.,
p . 46 .
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incorporate the arguments of such analysts and publicists as
Sir John Hackett, Richard Nixon, Richard Pipes, Paul Nitze,
Eugene Rostow, Edward Luttwak, but its significance and
contribution will be in encompassing their arguments with an
analysis of the underlying problems in the Soviet Union which
serves to support these views about Soviet motives and intentions.

The entire exercise is predicated on the existence

of a Soviet "Window of Opportunity" or that the Soviet elites
have a reason to believe they can act as if they have one.
The final section of the paper will examine Soviet
strategy, tactics, and possible scenarios based on our "worst
case approach" analysis of Soviet intentions.

Soviet foreign

behaviour will be projected on the basis of trends in their
behaviour currently and our perception of their goals.

These

goals being courses of action which provide for the maintenance
of the d_e facto Russian Empire.

Chapter I:

Geography

Traditional Influences on
Soviet Foreign Behaviour

and History
Geography and Fate have made it
vulnerable to attack, and experience
has impelled it to rely upon internal
authoritarianism and external
expansionism for defense.
Aspaturian

Fate gave Russia space, and Russians have prided themselves on their vast distances; however, Russia is only
2
Moscow.
Moscow, with an iron hand, has kept territories and
conquered peoples on a tight leash.

The realities of their

geographic position, have been the most permanent

conditioning

factors on the foreign behaviour of both the Russian Empire
and the Soviet Union.

Geography simplified the conquest ,of a

divided Russia, but it also simplified the expansion of a
unified Russian state.

3

A powerful Russian state could expand

in all directions until checked by superior force; a weak
Russia invited attack, on occasion, from more than one direction at once.
Through much of her history Russia suffered the constant
threat of invasion and the ravages of war as she had no natural
V. Aspaturian, "The Foreign Policy of the Soviet
Union," in Rosenau, J.N., Thompson, K.W., and Boyd, G. World
Politics (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 57.
2
Both symbolically and in real terms, Moscow represents
Russia; in close proximity are much of the population and
indus try.
3
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in Macridis,
R.D., (ed.) Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 164.
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boundary on the West or, until the 18th and 19th centuries,
on the East or South.

The past weaknesses of the Russian

frontier invited numerous invasions: more than one hundred
and fifty foreign invasions during the European Renaissance
(13th to the 15th centuries), and ten major wars, with
Sweden and Poland in the 17th and 18th centuries, the
Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean and Russo-Turk wars, in the
19th century, and, the Russo-Japanese and the two World Wars
4
during the first half of the 20th century.
The first one-third of its entire history
were under the Mongol-Tartar yoke.

the Russians

For century after century

Mongols, Swedes, Poles, Lithuanians, French and Germans made
devastating incursions into Russia, even to the point of
burning the capital, Moscow.

The memory of these disasters

and national humiliations has been preserved in the greatpower instinct of the people, to whom their imperialism seems
a strictly defensive phenomenon, not an aggressive one.
Hence, whether Russian expansionism has been aggressive or
defensive in nature is merely academic.

As Aspaturian notes:

In the absence of more obvious geographic
obstacles to her enemies, Russia's physical
security became irrevocably attached to
land space, while her psychological security
became inseparable from political centralization . 5
Thus, the foreign behaviour of both the Tsarist and
Soviet administrations has been characterized by military
4
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.:
Domestic Factors (Riverside: Dickenson Pub. Co., 1975), p. 75.
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 164.
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intervention and expansion for the defense of perceived
Russian interests.
The creation by Stalin of a belt of
satellite states in Eastern Europe in the
aftermath of the Second World War is very
much a part of this tradition, as is the
recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Anxiety regarding the future of Russian
influence in Eastern Europe led Brezhnev
in 1968--much as it had Nicholas I in 1831
regarding Poland--to adopt a policy of
military intervention.6
The Russian historical experience of numerous
invasions of their country helped shape the highly
character of Tsarist rule.

The Russians had

foreign

centralized

traditionally

"seen themselves facing a choice of unity under an autocrat
or subjugation by a foreign power."

Historically, this kind

of rule was justified by the fact that there could be no
society without the government's
and resources.
reaction.

complete control of all men

The national character became one of defensive

The whole of Russia's diplomatic history con-

sisted of dealing with unfriendly neighbours.

Russia had little

experience in friendly relations and her diplomacy was concerned with impressing an adversary with Russian strength and
massiveness in size, as Kennan noted, "impressing an adversary
Q

with the terrifying strength of Russian power...."
The territorial integrity

of Russia's historic borders

M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy

...., op. cit., p. 164.

C. Black, "The Limitation of Strategic Arms," Part I,
p. 6 quoted in M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy ...., op. cit.,
p. 75.
G. Kennan, Memoi rs, p. 560 quoted in M. Schwartz,
The Foreign Policy ...., op. cit., p. 76.
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and the acute sensitivity

to the vulnerability of the western

border became permanent policy objectives for any RussianSoviet regime--i.e. Stalin's end-of-World War II regathering
of lands campaign.

Since 1939, the Soviet Union has annexed

four of its former neighbours, seized territory from seven
9
more, and has made territorial demands upon two others; most
of this territory was previously

lost by a weakened Russia.

The post-World War II settlement in the region placed the
Soviet Union "in a position which resembled, at least in terms
of geography, that which existed between 1721 and 1809."
The international behaviour of the Soviet Union has
been consistent with that of its Tsarist predecessors.

Russia

had a strong imperial tradition; her Tsars created a great
empire and aimed it at world conquest.

Russia's history between

the 15th and 20th centuries is one of enormous expansion.
From Tsar to Commissar, the character of Russian expansion has
changed little.
Those instruments and rationalization of
imperial Russia's expansion, the ethnic
argument, Panslavism, even the Orthodoxy
were all to find their place in the arsenal
of Soviet Russia's foreign policy. By
1945, the goal of the Tsar's government
had striven for but never achieved was
fulfilled by their successors: Eastern
Europe was under the full domination of
Russia. The ethnic frontiers of Germany
were pushed back to where they had been in
the Middle Ages.
Though committed officially
to atheism, Stalin's government repressed the
Greek Catholic rite in Eastern Galicia and
East Prussia, Bessarabia-Bukovina, Moldavia, Finno-Karelia,
Southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles, Eastern Poland (Western Ukraine)
Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia).
C. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives," in
Lederer, I.J. (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1962), p. 8.

12
extended its efforts on behalf of the
Orthodox Church, just as Nicholas I's
government had done in the empire's
western domains in the 1830s and 1840s.
The potential sources of irredentism were
removed when all the Ukrainians and
Byelorussians were included in the USSR.
These factors are eloquent in themselves
as evidence of the strong continuity
between old and new r e g i m e s . H
Russian and Soviet territorial expansion has had three
objectives as its basis: strategic, economic, and nationalistic.
Russia's preoccupation with security

could best be handled by

reducing or eliminating the political power of neighbouring
states through military

force, and extending Russia's

frontiers

to natural barriers such as oceans, deserts, and mountains, or to
long stretches of sparsely inhabited borderlands of little
geopolitical interest to other major powers.
Economic interests are directly related to security
interests and "on no subject has there been more general agreement among Russian and [Soviet] leaders than on the importance
of economic strength to national security."

12

Economic

interests dictated Russia acquire access to open seas, as an
outlet for trade.

Peter the Great built St. Petersburg towards

this end, and to prevent the domination of the Baltic region by
another great power.

He accomplished this by: "annexing

territories inhabited by non-Russians, by encouraging a policy
of neutrality on the part of the states of this region, and by
exerting strong pressure on these states when they allied
A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence
Pub., 1974), p. 12.

(New York: Praeger

12
C. Black,
op. cit., p. 14.

'The Pattern of Russian Objectives,"

13
,,13
themselves with other great powers."""

From St. Petersburg,

Russia acquired security for its economic interests: it
ensured an outlet for trade with the West.

The Soviet

Union's attack on Finland in November 1939 can be understood
in terms of Moscow's continuing security interest in the area
to defend against the Nazi threat to Leningrad.

Stalin felt

it imperative to create greater strength in depth, i.e. to
move back the frontier from Leningrad.

The end result of this

action was Soviet expansion and annexation of a good part of
Finland.
Nationalistic interests motivating expansion have used
religious, dynastic or nationality
conquests.

claims as the basis for

Tsarist and Soviet regimes have felt a mandate to

unify territories considered to be Russian by virtue of reasons
cited above.

The 14th and 15th centuries saw the grand princes

of Moscow determined

to unify the territories which had paid

tribute to the Tartars.

Later, Russian claims on Polish

territory were based on the fact that much of the territory
was inhabited by Ukrainians or Byelorussians who are close to
the Great Russians in religion and language.

Russian annexation

was facilitated by the fact that "no upper or middle class had
as yet arisen to claim a national distinctness."
The important question is whether Soviet

14
expansion

has ended, or whether there are still strong incentives for
the Soviet leadership to expand and in what directions.
13
C. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives,
op. cit., p. 14.
14
A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, op. cit., p. 4.
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Soviet preoccupation with regional security has important
international ramifications because: "... regional security
with respect to bordering states could in effect mean global
security, because of the size and diversity of its economic
base."

We shall turn to some of these considerations shortly

and deal in some depth with them in the final chapter.

Cultural Influences on Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy
Every ancient and deeply rooted
self-contained culture, especially
if it is spread over a wide part
of the earth's surface, constitutes
a self-contained world, full of
riddles and surprises to Western
thinking.
Solzhenitsyn,
A World Split Apart
Certainly, some of Russia's conquests cannot be explained from an economic, political, strategic or any other
reasonable point of view.

Some expansion and imperialism can

perhaps be understood in terms of how at varying times the
Russians seem to have believed in a historical mission.

One

theory posited Moscow as a third Rome; in this theory Moscow
was held to be the successor to Rome and Constantinople.
Therefore Moscow became the heir to the imperial tradition of
Rome, and the centre of the Christian world.
Perhaps this grandiose conception of
Moscow's role in history should be held
to account in some degree for the vigor
of Ivan's offensives against Tartar
S.B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), p. 191.
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territories in the East and the Baltic
provinces in the West, and also for his
matrimonial ambitions, which included a
proposal to Queen Elizabeth of England.16
Another doctrine held that it was Russia's destiny to
liberate all Slavic peoples and create a "federation embracing
all the non-German peoples of Eastern and South Eastern Europe
up to and including Constantinople.
In the writings of Danilevskii, this
ambitious objective was supported by
a cyclical theory of history which
maintained that Russia was destined
to succeed Europe as the eleventh in
a series of dominant civilizations of
which Egypt was the first.18
It is interesting to note that some of the great
literary masters the Russians have produced were devout
imperialists.

Pushkin wrote a militaristic poem about the

suppression of the Polish uprising of 1831, and the taking of
Warsaw, by Russian troops.

Dostoievsky yearned passionately

for the conquest of Constantinople; Gogol was fiercely proud
in his writing that his country covered such a huge expanse.
That expanse was truly gigantic; in the fifteenth century the
Duchy of Moscow comprised

15,000 square miles and by the jtime

of the last Tsar, Nicholas II, the empire comprised

8.5

.,,.
. ,
19
million square mxles.
16
C. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives,"
op. cit., p. 24.
C. Black, "The Patterns of Russian Objectives,"
op. cit., p. 26.
Ibid. , p. 26.
19
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy

...., op. cit., p. 73

16
Observers such as Friedrich Engels saw Russians as
"dreaming of world supremacy'

20

and the French observer of

nineteenth-century Russia, the Marquis de Custine stated "an
immense ambition ferments in the hearts of the Russian people,
That nation, essentially
A
•
- •
domxnatxon.

aggressive

... dreams of world

»21

Culturally, Russia developed a distinctive and lasting
self-image.

Russia developed over the centuries a religious •

and cultural self-conceit, convinced that its own religious
and political arrangements far surpassed all the others.

22

It was long believed, as Dostoevsky observed,
that close relations with the rest of Europe
might even exercise a harmful and corrupt
influence upon the Russian mind and the
Russian idea; that it might distort Orthodoxy
itself and lead Russia along the path to
perdition.23
This cultural self-conceit manifested

itself in a belief in

a higher spiritual historical mission of the Russian nation.
Predating Peter's reign and going back to
the earliest days of Muscovy, there is the
notion of the historical mission of the
Russian nation as the representative and
defender of eastern Christianity as against
Catholicism and also (and especially) as
against Islam. The concrete expression of
this mission was the goal of expelling
Turkey from Europe and regaining Con„,
stantinople and the straits for Christendom.
20
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy

op. cit., p. 73.

21
22

Ibid., p. 7 3.
Ibid. , p. 78.

23
Ibid. , p. 7 7.
o/
A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, op. cit., p. 12.
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This self-image of superiority

and historical contempt

for the anti-Russian or foreign led to Russia's policy of
condemning Europe and the West.

Also, as Schwartz notes,

"this exalted self-image gave rise to glorification of the
state and governmental absolutism on the one hand, and a
Messianic kind of imperialism on the other."

25

The Bolsheviks became heirs to the Russian history and
cultural legacy; they gave Russia new goals and aspirations
but could not avoid the contours of a Russian state and falling
heir to the assets and liabilities of its predecessors.
Certainly Marxist-Leninist

26

ideology like any social creed

assimilated different ideologies and social movements such as
Slavic nationalism and the Russian notion of superior culture.
The ideology was consistent with Russian messianic traditions
... [it] reinforced the psychological obsession
for security ... provided an ideological
rationale for assuming the implacable hostility
of the outside world and sanctified Russian
expansion with the ethical mission of liberating
the downtrodden masses of the world from
their oppressors.27
The ideology easily lent itself to the assimilation of traditional beliefs, goals, and objectives of Russian foreign
behaviour.
The hostile West of the Slavophiles became
the hostility of capitalism and imperialism;
instead of the parochial messianism of the
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy

...., op. cit.,

p. 78.
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," op. cit.,
p. 165.
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pan-Slav enthusists, Marxism provided Russia
with a mission of universal transcendence-transforming the outside world into her own
image, in fulfillment of her historic destiny
and as the only permanent guarantee of
absolute security.28
Marxist-Leninism purports to be a scientifically
determined ongoing process with unavoidable laws--thus its
superiority and universal validity.

The doctrine of pro-

letarian internationalism declared the potential interest of
the Soviet Union in the domestic and foreign affairs of all
other nations of the world.
Like the rulers of Old Muscovy, they tend
to see themselves as the bearers of a
unique message and the center of a new,
higher civilization. Now as in the past
Moscow proclaims itself an example to
all peoples.29
*

*

*

Traditionally, The Kremlin's masters, whether Tsarist
or Soviet, have been expansionary.

We have looked at the geo-

graphic, historical, and cultural influences on foreign
behaviour and have found a marked continuity, i.e. expansion
motivated by strategic, economic, and nationalistic objectives,
which have characterized the old and new regimes.
What directions and what rationalizations will the Kremlin
be likely to adopt in furthering this historical drive of
expansion?

The leaders of the Kremlin are conscious of the

socially useful aspect of a legitimizing rationale for the
28
V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," op. cit.,
p. 165.
29
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy

...., op. cit., p. 82.
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blatant use of force.

In Eastern Europe the Brezhnev doctrine

provides the legitimizing cover for the imperial role of the
Red Army.

Outside of Eastern Europe, on what grounds in the

pursuit of which objectives will Soviet imperialism and
territorial expansion be rationalized?
Whatever the future territorial claims of
the Soviet Union may b e , their formal
basis is likely to continue to be on
nationality lines. Natural features and
historic claims become objectives as they
coincide with nationality f r o n t i e r s . ^
Given the far-ranging borders of the USSR and the
many minorities encompassed within, who have strong ethnic
ties to peoples in bordering states, the Kremlin has its grounds
for territorial expansion.

What for previous regimes had been

the historical mission of uniting the Slavic peoples, has been
expanded to a mandate to unite the peoples of the USSR with
their ethnic cousins.

The obvious paradox is that expansion

on this basis would lead to the territorial expansion of the
Soviet Union over much of the World.

Marxist-Leninist

ideology dictates that most of the governments of the world are
not legitimate, therefore once the Soviet Union is strong
enough it can rationalize "liberating" peoples unfairly
living under imperialist governments.
It is likely that Soviet expansion will occur along
the periphery of the USSR.

30
S.B. Cohen, Geography and Politics
p. 204.

...., op. cit.,

20
For a brief period (1723-32), all of the
southern shore of the Caspian Sea was
held by Russia. Soviet interests have been
somewhat more restricted, to date, encouraging
separatist movements in Persian Azerbaijan
and in Kurdish Iranian areas south and west
of Lake Urmia.
From such positions, Turkey
would be hemmed in on two sides, and northern
Iraq would be directly exposed to the Soviet
Union.31
Soviet territorial expansion in this area under the facade of
nationalistic and historical claims, would really be furthering
the economic interests of the USSR.

From such a position the

Soviets would be given a position to exert political
pressure of almost undeniable magnitude on the Persian Gulf
States.

This position would also facilitate a military inter-

vention in the Gulf if the Soviet leaders adopt that option.
Certainly, however, the overriding bases for the
Kremlin's imperialism under the old and new regimes have been
strategic.
by China.

Today, age-old fears of the east are represented
China easily provides the analogy for the Russian

fear of the yellow-skinned men (the Mongols) who ruled her
for 300 years.

As a reaction to this sense of threat, the

Kremlin has increased its aggressiveness toward China, its
possible allies, and the nations that border it.
Expansion and military

intervention by the Kremlin

in the Middle East and against China in the near term is both
consistent and probable given our understanding of the motives
for traditional Russian and Soviet expansionism.
chapter will deal with probable Soviet

The final

expansionism.

31
S.B. Cohen, Geography and Politics
p. 204.

op. cit.,

Chapter II:

Place of the USSR in the
International System

Today, there is no question of any
significance which can be decided without
the Soviet Union or in opposition to it
... Moreover, it is precisely our
proposals ... that are the center of
political discussions.
A.A. Gromyko
at the XXIVth Party Congress
(1971)1
With the change in Soviet status (international recognition as a superpower) the traditional dilemma of physical
security and the traditional stance of inferiority were altered
and erased respectively.

However, the crucial element in

the modern Soviet perception lies in the degree to which and
the way in which traditional habits of mind, policy postures
and priorities are modified, if at all, to suit the presentday reality.

Certainly, Gromyko's boast at the XXIV Party

Congress is grounded in fact; it therefore becomes

significant

how the Soviet elite views the internatinna] system and in
particular the nuclear relationship with the U.S.
The Soviet ideological prism reflects an
image of the world that is virtually unrecognizable to a non-Communist, yet it is
on this image that Soviet foreign policy
is based...
This image is accepted as the
real world by Soviet leaders.2
Quoted in Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View,"
Soviet Strategy in Europe, ed. R. Pipes (New York: Crane,
Russak & Co. Inc., 1976), p. 3.
2

V. Aspaturian in R.C. Macridis, Foreign Policy in
World Politics, op. cit., p. 165.
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The Communist view of the international system is
basically simple.
right to exist.

No other regimes have, in principle, any
The reason why Soviet elites have had to

accept the Western Capitalist dominated system, however unwillingly, lies in the reality of the situation--that is,
that the Soviet Union has never been strong enough to challenge
the world as a whole and has had to "recognize" this state
3
system, much as it has had to recognize the Soviet Union.
Detente
Opponents of detente with the Soviets argue, that for
the Kremlin, dgtente is a means of avoiding nuclear war, while
the Soviet Union goes about pursuing its long-term objectives.
Detente then is seen as a framework of relationships within
which the USSR "can better pursue an advantageous balance of
military power and exploit the most vulnerable areas of discontent and turbulence in the world."

Detente in no way

therefore precludes Soviet efforts to acquire more and more
clients and thereby slowly weaken the United States, until
the U.S. is so weakened and isolated that it will accept the
position of an ineffectual actor on the world stage.
3
As Robert Conquest notes: "... no non-Communist regime
is in principle legitimate, and in the long run all must be
destroyed ... questions of tactical possibility make the temporary acceptance of non-Communist states a necessary historical
compromise." R. Conquest, "Why the Soviet Elite is different
from us," in Atlantic Monthly Quarterly, Vol. 16 #1, p. 72.
Robert E. Osgoode, "The East-West Global Equilibrium,"
The Atlantic Community Quarterly, summer of '79, p. 144.
W.M. Jones, "Soviet Leadership Politics and Leadership Views on the Use of Military Force," Rand, July '79, p. 18.
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Detente is also seen to have provided the Soviets with
the opportunity

of channelling increasing amounts of resources

to the armaments sector while yet increasing to some degree
resources utilized by the consumer sector.

In short, the

Soviets have been able to circumvent the strict economic
choice of guns at the expense of butter.

Detente then is

conceded by its opponents in the West to have been a brilliant
tactical stroke on the part of the Soviet elite.

Western

funds and technology served to stabilize the Soviet system and thus,
directly or indirectly, boosted the Soviet Union's military
potential.

On this point it is interesting to recall the

famous dialogue between Lenin and Radek.
Lenin:

"Comrades don't panic, when things
go very hard for u s , we will give
a rope to the bourgeoisie, and the
bourgeoisie will hang itself."

Radek:

"Vladimir Ilyich, but where are we
going to get enough rope to hang
the whole bourgeoisie?"

Lenin:

"They'll supply us with it."

Sixty years later, a western observer might well add
"Plus 5a change, plus c'est la meme chose."

The defence-

heavy industry complex is the most modern societal sector with
a greater concentration of scientific, technological, managerial
talent and labor skill than any other sector of the Soviet
economy.

This was in part made possible by the competition

In the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet armed
forces had to use some of Moscow's transit buses, while in the
case of their recent invasion of Afghanistan, other than air
transport they were able to use trucks from a Ford built plant
Quoted in Carl Gersham "Selling them the Rope,"
Commentary, April '79, p. 35.
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among Western interests in providing credits and technological
know-how to a regime with the avowed determination to someday
aid and preside in the downfall of the economic and political
system of the West.
The rationale by which the West entered a period of
relaxed tension and cooperation was based on three goals:
(1) to provide an atmosphere which would lead to a slow-down
in the arms race; (2) to provide an atmosphere where the Soviet
Union would curtail its imperialmeddling

in the affairs of

other states; (3) to provide an atmosphere which would be
conducive for the Soviet elite to liberalize the state's reQ

pression of dissidents.

It was hoped and believed that

detente would lead to a freer and better-informed

Soviet

Union, willing to compromise and liberalize in order to receive
awards for meritorious behavior.

The reality of the situation

has been that Soviet negotiators easily played off Western
interests and received credits, and technology for minimal
concessions on the part of the Kremlin.
Moscow has had considerable success in dispelling fears
in the West that its military build-up is not greater than
its legitimate defensive needs.

The Kremlin is realistically

apprehensive with China on one border and NATO on the other
(given the tragic historic experience of numerous
invasions, their paranoia is understandable).

foreign

The Kremlin

Q

See, D.K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," Foreign
Policy, No. 32, Fall of *78.
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is well aware that arms restraint on the part of the U.S.
government has helped enable the USSR to reach parity in
strategic nuclear arms and superiority

in conventional arms.

Certainly, arms limitation talks with the U.S., while perhaps providing some rationality to the arms race, have done
little to limit the creation of ever-more numerous weapons
for the Soviet armed forces.
... the share absorbed by the defense
sector of the Soviet Gross National Product
has grown from some 12-13 per cent in 1970
to perhaps as much as 18 per cent in 1980;
... Incidentally, in the same period
(1970-79), U.S. defense expenditures as
a share of the GNP have declined from
7.5 per cent to 4.6 per cent, and in
constant 1972 dollars, from $85.1 to
65.0 Billion. 9
While the West can appreciate what it perceives as the
defensive motivations

for the Soviet arms build-up, it might

have realized that:
The Soviet Union cannot conceivably satisfy
its ambitions to be immune from foreign
threats both
real and imagined, without
gaining a decisive preponderance over its
potential opponents.10
While the superpowers reached essential equivalence in
the early 1970s the Kremlin has continued to enhance the
military

capability of the Soviet Union.

The single most

important factor in this continued arms build-up has been the
realization that the Soviet Union's recognition as a superpower rests solely on its military

capability.

As Simes notes:

"Soviet Defense Expenditure in the Era of SALT,"
U.S. Strategic Institute Report 79-1 (Washington, D.C. 1979),
pp. 10-11.
D.K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," op. cit., p. 49
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Economically, the Soviet Union is no match
for the U.S. The international appeal of
Soviet-style communism is on the decline.
Consequently, to ask the Soviets to refrain
from "excessive" military build-up is to
ask them to refrain from being a superpower.
The Soviet elite have not been impressed by Western
demands that they cease interfering in the affairs of "Third
World" states; this is seen as crass hypocricy.

The West has

a long history of interference in the affairs of African
nations especially.

However, there does seem to be a pattern

to Soviet adventurism in Africa--namely

to exert political and

military pressure to deny access to the West of oil from the
Persian Gulf and vital mineral resources from South Africa.
It is obvious that Moscow retains the perception of
the U.S. as its competitor in a serious struggle of resources
and political will; as one analyst noted:
It is particularly disturbing that the
USSR is pursuing a strategy apparently
designed to deny the U.S. access to such
areas as the Persian Gulf, which are crucial
to American security ...12
The issue of human rights is seen by the Kremlin as
having a serious ulterior motive.

Moscow perceives it as being

in direct contradiction to its interpretation of the spirit
of detente; that is, a relaxation of tensions in areas where
either side feels its vital interests are in jeopardy.

Carter's

emphasis on human rights is perceived by the Soviet elite to be
D.K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," op. cit., p. 51.

27
a challenge to the very survival of the regime and its international prestige.

Thus, as Simes notes:

Carter's application of particularly strong
language toward the Soviet Union - while some
states escaped criticism on human rights for
reasons of political expediency - did nothing
to enhance the credibility of Washington's
moral offensive in the eyes of the Soviet elite 13
A New Cold War
Contention over the human rights crusade of the new
Carter administration

led to the visible deterioration of

relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Carter vociferously hammered away at the Soviets for their
treatment of political dissidents.

He punished them by the

cancellation of the sale of a high-technology

computer and

imposed presidential control over future exports of oil technology.

These moves infuriated Brezhnev and the Soviet elite,

and led them to doubt Carter's commitment to their perception
of detente.

These doubts were substantiated in the Soviet

eyes by subsequent actions of the Carter administration.
The Kremlin watched as the SALT II debate became a
vehicle for American hawks to win commitments for increased
arms expenditures.

The Kremlin's offer of Oct. 7/79 to

negotiate new reductions in Europe was ignored, and their
threats regarding the deployment of theater missiles in Europe
were also ignored.

They had to watch as the U.S. moved con-

tinually closer to China, finally offering Peking the trade
13 D.K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," op. cit., p. 57
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terms that Moscow had long coveted and long been denied.
The invasion of Afghanistan, the opponents of detente
hope, will prove to be a major watershed in U.S.-Soviet
relations.

They argue the invasion signified a major change

in the Kremlin's perception of the value of "detente."
Prior to this invasion it appeared

that the Soviet elite was

content to use military power as a fulcrum for political
influence but not up to the point of risking a confrontation
which would seriously shake the foundations of detente.
They see the Kremlin with this move indicating they no longer
need rewards from the U.S. for suitable behaviour nor do they
fear punishment

from the U.S.

Western "hawks" believe the invasion indicates that
the Kremlin perceives the balance of power as having shifted
favourably in Moscow's direction.

However, it is by no means

self-evident that the invasion of Afghanistan was the start
of a carefully planned movement aimed at direct control by
the USSR of any Middle Eastern oil producing country, or even
at the more limited target of an Indian Ocean port.

Many

observers interpret it as primarily a defensive move, in two
senses: (1) it may have been intended to cut off the Central
Asian republics of the USSR from any infection by Islamic
nationalism.

If the Moslem insurgents had eventually been

victorious over a Soviet-backed

regime in Afghanistan, this

might have given Uzbecks and Tadzhiks in the USSR dangerous
ideas; (2) it may have been intended to forestall any
possibility of severe damage to the USSR's prestige through
a loss of control and influence in Afghanistan.
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These considerations could have been enough to outweigh the expected political and economic costs of Western
and Third World reaction, especially when relations with the
U.S.A. had deteriorated anyway.

The possibility that at

some later date there would be an opportunity to extend the
USSR's influence decisively in the Middle East, may simply
have been an added but marginal attraction.
Strategists such as Georgetown's Edward Luttwak, argue
that even if the invasion was motivated by defensive concerns
on the part of the Kremlin, the ramifications for states in
the area and for the West are very serious.

Traditionally

as the Russian Empire has expanded "new layers of insecurity
that must be remedied by further expansion are invariably
found." 1 4
In strictly military terms, the occupation of
Afghanistan has provided the Soviets with bases from which:
... Soviet fighter-bombers could now
interdict at will the vital traffic of oil
tankers entering and leaving the Gulf;...
Soviet land-based aircraft could now
neutralize the air-power superiority that the
U.S. would otherwise enjoy in the immediate
area by virtue of its naval aviation on
board the great aircraft carriers. l->
Therefore, Luttwak argues, whatever the motivation for the
invasion of Afghanistan the fait ac compli has dealt a serious
blow to American strength overall.

Any further expansion by

E.N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," Commentary,
April 1980, p. 43.
Ibid., p. 4 3.
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the Soviets into the Indian Ocean area, he believes, will
probably originate from Southern Afghanistan across the
deserts of Baluchistan.

This route is more practical for

the Soviets than through their common border with Turkey,
Kurdistan, or Iran, since these areas would be populated
by 50 million inhabitants.

Also, as Luttwak warns, the

Soviet Union has increased its powers of political persuasion
on the Gulf states merely by its proximity and enhanced
capability.

He states:
While hatred of the Soviet Union has no
doubt increased, so has fear, and great
military empires do not ordinarily seek
love but rather the anxious respect that
fear can best inspire. 16

It is probable that the Kremlin was confident that th
U.S. would not react with an extreme response (to their
December

'79 invasion of Afghanistan) since in August of 197

the U.S. administration had failed to get Soviet troops out
of a country much closer to the U.S., i.e. Cuba.

Mr. Carter

and Secretary Vance had stated "the status quo is unacceptab
however two months later President Carter was on national
television to say in essence that the status quo was accepta
The crisis turned out to be a non-crisis, but the damage to
the balance of power and perceived U.S. strength of will was
cons iderable.
The Soviets must have noted the lack of unity in the
West in the weeks after the initial capture of the U.S. Emba
16 E.N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," op. cit.,
p. 43.
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in Iran, and probably felt they could gamble that Afghanistan
would not lead to U.S. allies denying the credits and technology they need.

The combination of events and the per-

ception of the Carter administration as weak, may have served
to convince the Kremlin that the U.S. lacks the resolve to
confront the Soviet Union.

If this is the case,then the

Kremlin's invasion of Afghanistan probably indicates the
Soviets intend to capitalize on opportunities to do so.
Soviet motives then, behind the invasion, are perhaps not as
significant as the fact that the Kremlin sees itself as
strong enough to risk jettisoning the framework of detente.
It is instructive then to heed the warnings of Aleksander
Solzhenitsyn; if his views correspond to those of the men in
the Kremlin, then we can better understand why Moscow may
feel it can exploit perceived advantages.
... a decline in courage is particularly
noticeable among the ruling and intellectual
elites, causing an impression of a loss of
courage by the entire society... Must one
point out that from ancient times a decline
in courage has been considered the first
symptom of the end?l'
Solzhenitsyn believes a cult of material well-being has sapped
the strength of Americans, that Americans are not prepared to
risk their lives to defend themselves or their interests.
Therefore he concludes American foreign policy will increasing
become characterized by concessions, accommodations and betray
A. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart (New York
Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), p. 11.
Ibid . , p. 45.

32
A Window of Opportunity
Reinforcing the Kremlin's perception of its greater
national strength is an emerging confidence in the supremacy
of their military forces.
1982,

19

It is estimated that in or about

the Soviets will have a first strike capability.

The

Soviets will be able to destroy most of the land-based missiles,
missile submarines and nuclear bombers of the United States in
a surprise attack.

The surviving components of the U.S. triad,

while capable of a counter-attack, will not have the accuracy
or time span to destroy the unused missiles of the Russians.

20

Therefore, a scenario can be envisaged where given temperate
weather conditions the President could be faced with fatalities
as low as five million American deaths.

21

His options will be

to surrender, or launch his remaining nuclear weapons, killing
several dozen million Russians,

22

and bringing the rest of the

Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal down on the cities of the United
States, killing up to half the population of the U.S.
If this is so, the Soviets can then reasonably expect
the U.S. not to provoke a crisis situation (during this
period of Soviet nuclear superiority) which might lead to
a nuclear exchange.

It is also rational to expect a U.S.

president to surrender if the USSR were to launch an attack
19
Brent Scowcroft, "A Military Report," Atlantic
Community Quarterly, Winter 79-80, p. 411.
20
Paul H. Nitze, SALT II, The Objectives Vs the
Re sults (Washington: The Committee on the Present Danger,
Undated), p. 3.
21
Ibid . , p. 3.
22 Ibid., p. 3
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solely on American strategic forces.

Paul Nitze, who helped

negotiate the first Strategic Arms Limitations Talks agreement with the Soviets warns:
We do not have to assume that the Soviet
Union will actually attack U.S. strategic
forces-. The point is that they will have
the capacity to increase their advantage
with a counterforce first strike. After
such a first strike, the U.S. would still
have a capability for a second strike
retaliation against Soviet economic and
political targets - in plain words, against
their "hostage" cities and industrial centers.
If Soviet civil defense failed, we could do
"unacceptable damage" to them, but their
forces held in reserve would still be greater
than ours, and we have no effective civil
(or air) defense. Their third-strike
potential would make our second strike less
credible.
It would leave the U.S. with a
dangerously inadequate deterrent.23
A president could order significant damage to parts of the
USSR but he would do so with the knowledge (because the Soviets
had taken out his land-based missiles) that the Soviets could
hit back much harder, therefore he should surrender.
Soviet strategic preponderance will allow them to
make a first strike five years before the MX would give the
U.S. similar power.

Thus, Moscow has reason to believe that

it has a "window of opportunity" extending until the United
States restores the balance of power.

During this period they

will have a strategic opening to pressure the West at geopolitically

sensitive spots like the Persian Gulf.

The tables

23
Committee on the Present Danger, Is America Becoming
Number 2? : Current Trends' in U.S.-Soviet Military Balance,
released on Oct. 5, 1978.
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have been t u r n e d — i n

1962 Krushchev backed down in the Cuban

missile crisis when faced with U.S. strategic superiority.
Richard Pipes argues that the Soviets have never
accepted

the U.S. strategic doctrine in which nuclear weapons

exist to deter the use of the other side's arsenal.

Pipes

notes that Soviet theoretical writings and actual developments of nuclear weapons indicates that the Kremlin sees
these weapons as having more than deterrent value.

He states:

There exists a high degree of probability
that in the event of general war the Soviet
Union intends to use a part of its strategic
arsenal in a devastating preemptive strike
which would make an American retaliatory
strike suicidal and possibly inhibit it
altogether. The stress on large throwweight, combined with high accuracies of its
I.C.B.M.s is a good indication that the
Soviet Union intends to develop a first-strike
capability.24
The Soviet civil defense program which the leadership
has held to be a priority,

25

has given them a unilateral

advantage over the U.S. and greatly strengthens the position
of the Soviets.

The emphasis and effectiveness of the Soviet

civil defense program tends to destabilize the deterrent
value of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Paul Nitze warns:

The U.S. can then no longer hold as significant a proportion of the Soviet
population as a hostage to deter a Soviet
attack. Concurrently, Soviet industrial
vulnerability has been reduced by deliberate
policies, apparently adopted largely for
military reaons ... In sum, the ability
of U.S. nuclear power to destroy without
0 /

R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," Commentary,
April '80, p. 35.
25 Whether fear of the U.S. or China, is immaterial
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question the bulk of Soviet industry and
a large proportion of the Soviet population
is by no means as clear as it once was, even
if one assumes most of U.S. striking power
to be available and directed to this end. 6
What experts like Eugene Rostow, Richard Pipes, and
Paul Nitze, hope to convince the Carter administration is that
the Soviets will achieve shortly a "warfighting/warwinning
ability"

27

in a nuclear war.

This ability "requires the

ability to both destroy the enemy's t i.e. the U.S.J
waging war and to defend oneself from attack.

means of

28

The Soviet first strike capability rests on its large
missiles and its civil defense preparations.

The U.S. has

given civil defense little emphasis and has nothing comparable
to the heavy megatonnage missiles of the Soviets.

The Soviets

then are not following a doctrine of mutual deterrence and
nuclear stalemate, but rather realize that clear nuclear superior
is the ultimate weapon of coercive diplomacy.

We might well

soon have an answer to Kissinger's often quoted statement:
"What in the name of God is strategic superiority?

What is the

significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at
these levels of numbers?

What do you do with it."

29

The

answer is of course the ability to checkmate your opponent
"without having to fight either a nuclear or a conventional war."
26 Paul H. Nitze, SALT II, The Objectives
, op. cit.
27,Daniele Goure and Gordon H. McCormick, "Soviet Strategic
Defense: The Neglected Dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Balance,"
Orbis, Spring '80, p. 105.
28

I b i d . , p. 105.

29 Department of State Bulletin

(July 29, 1974), p. 215
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Feb.

E. Rostow, "The Case Against SALT II," Commentary
'79, p. 30.
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The U.S. has also made a fundamental mistake regarding
"parity" between the superpowers; namely that "parity" once
achieved will preclude the use of force by either against
the other, as Thomas Larson points out:
... it should be noted that the most even
balance of military capabilities cannot
possibly rule out the persistence of
significant disparities in the amount and
kinds of military power that can be applied
in various local situations. o x
The Soviet strategic arms build-up has been matched by its
conventional arms build-up in tanks, in naval forces, and
in troop transport planes able to deploy its ground troops
far afield.

32

The Americans, by allowing the Soviets in most

areas of conventional weapons to gain superiority, have given
the Kremlin the option of acting militarily in opposition to
vital U.S. interests... tThisl

opens vast doubts about the

security of the NATO alliance, whose very foundation is the
33
American nuclear guarantee."
The U.S. has relied upon the
implicit threat to use strategic nuclear weapons in support
of theater forces, but this threat has lost some of its
credibility.

However if there is doubt where Western Europe

and Japan are concerned, this threat has little credibility in
31
Thomas B. Larson, Soviet American Rivalry (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1978), p. 216.
32
"Since 1970, the Soviets have added about 130,000 to
their Warsaw Pact forces. There has been a 40% increase in
Soviet tanks, and tank divisions have increased by up to 100%
in some categories, and over 4,000 armored personnel carriers
were added during 1978 alone. It should be noted ... Soviet forces
deployed against the People's Republic of China have been increased
and improved even more remarkably... The Soviets have given equal
attention to their naval capability." Brent Scowcroft, "A
Military Report," op. cit., p. 412.
33
E.N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan ....," op. cit., p. 46.
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areas of less significance since:
Theorists whose concept of deterrence is
limited to massive retaliation after
a Soviet attack would have nothing of
interest to say to a president facing
conventional defeat in the Persian Gulf
or in Western Europe.34
The prospect of defeating American interests over
much of the globe may become irresistable for the Soviets
Moscow, viewing its "window of opportunity", might "well
anticipate the ability to wage World War III successfully, „35
Military leaders inside the Kremlin may convince the political
leadership

that military victory is possible, and at a rela-

tively low cost.

Luttwak argues that the Soviets may well

prefer to accomplish through force of arms, what they might
feel is impossible without: namely, the reduction of internal
difficulties.

Thus he warns:

If, by war, the Soviet Union could achieve
a permanent enhancement of its position in
some decisive map-changing way, all would
become easier in the future, even the
possibility of reduced military expenditures
being imaginable. Alternatively, successful
warfare might seize valuable resources for the
Soviet state, and then the advantage of such
resources might serve to modify the future that
now looms so unfavourable.36
Western "hawks" worry that the combination of emerging critical
problems, military preponderance, and historical track record,
will lead the Kremlin to not pass up its opportunity of perhaps
34
C.S. Gray and K. Payne, "Victory is Possible,"
Foreign Policy #39, Summer of '80, p. 15.
35 Ibid. , p. 22.
36

Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," op. cit., p. 46

securing the empire.
The continual emphasis on building armed forces which
may be able to challenge any combination of possible opponents,
while Soviet envoys have talked about peace and disarmament
has given the Soviets a unilateral advantage over the U.S.,
West Europe, Japan, and China.

It is interesting to recall

the warning of Sun Tzu, the fourth century B.C. strategist:
When the enemy's envoys speak in humble
terms, but he continues his preparations,
he will advance.3'
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Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University
Press, 1913), p. 119.

Chapter III:

Internal Exigencies

The Legitimacy Crisis
When the existence of the Church is
threatened, she is released from the
commandments of morality. With unity
as the end, the use of every means is
sanctified, even cunning, treachery,
violence, simony, prison, death.
For all order is for the sake of the
community, and the individual must
be sacrificed to the common good.
Dietrich Von Nieheim
Bishop of Verden:
De schismate libri
III A.D. 1411.
From an operational viewpoint the Marxist-Leninist
ideology preserved and strengthened the traditions of Russian
society and provided an expansionist power's creed which
afforded protection to

the Soviet state. From its inception,

the ideology was well-suited

to the totalitarian form of

government since it is a future-oriented doctrine which takes
pressure off the legitimacy functions of any present governmen t.
The early faith in the imminent transformation of man
and the state has disappeared; but the structure of power
created in those hopeful early days remains, and has lately
grown increasingly repressive and self-serving.

A great many

nominal communists in the Soviet Union no longer give more
than lip-service to their ideology because their leaders no
longer act as if they believed in it.
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The ideology has not
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produced what it was expected to produce.

After Stalin and

the diluted Stalinism of Brezhnev, the Soviet Union has ceased
to be a model that many nations would want to imitate.
The system has outlived the hopes that gave birth to
it.

Indeed, it has grown more rigid as the ideology has

faded because it can no longer call on a widespread belief
in the ideology to justify its own existence. The KGB, and
its cousins, deal with the dissidents; the debate about needed
changes remains muffled.

Today, the central role of the

ideology is its use as a means of internal political and social
control.

The egalitarian spirit of Marxism has been lost in

bureaucratic

elitism.

The loss of conviction in the ideology is tantamount
to Christianity losing faith in heaven.

The Communist Party

needs to instill a conviction that Utopia is ahead because it
is the basis for a legitimacy that would evaporate in the
absence of popular will.

Building a socialist paradise can

excuse the Soviet elite from charges of self-seeking and greed
for power and privilege.
An important consequence strategically involved in the
loss of legitimacy is the "Soviet imperial position in Eastern
Europe and the Brezhnev doctrine of limited
which safeguards it ideologically."

sovereignty

Soviet hegemony over

the so-called "fraternal" countries rests on the Red Army,
S. Bialer, "The Soviet Political Elite and Internal
Developments in the U.S.S.R.," in The Soviet Empire: Expansion
and Detente, edited by W.E. Griffith (Toronto: Lexington Books,
1976), p. 47.

but the basis for the use of force is the legitimacy of the
CPSU as the sole repository of the "truth".
The Soviet Union faces serious difficulties such as:
shortages of goods, particularly food; labour surpluses and
labour shortages in some areas; deteriorating workplace dis
cipline; alcoholism; pay scale inequalities, shortages of
energy and raw materials, and many other increasing difficulties.

The prescription would be liberalizing the author

tarian nature of the regime to increase productivity and
overcome bureaucratic bottlenecks.
The basic necessity for economic reform including in part, the establishment of
greater economic independence for state
enterprises, decentralization of planning
and the introduction of elements of a
mixed economy - appears incontrovertible.
However any such reforms, inevitably
affecting the very tases of the totalitarian
economic and social structure, are very unlikely at the present time.2
The Communist Party cannot allow a liberalization
process to occur since greater freedom of expression for al
Soviet citizens might allow the germination of secessionist
movements which ultimately could split the USSR asunder. *
Suppose a free political debate were to break out and ramif
on such matters as the devolution of decision-making
Moscow, the decollectivisation

from

(partial or total) of agri-

culture, the toleration of religious beliefs and observance
the burden of defense expenditures, and other areas of disThe Guardian, March 16, 1980, Sakharov, from Exile,
Relates his hopes and fears, p. 15.
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agreement.

Soon there could be strong polarization of attitudes

along ethnic lines, with most of the national groups taking the
more liberal line most of the time.
What is more, some of the most restive minorities would
be ones concentrated

in sizeable and well-defined

territories;

they would be well-placed' to secede (which the Soviet Constitution formally allows them to do) were the situation to
become ripe.

In the meantime they may increasingly

orchestrate

their several protests, the Central Asiatic Republics and
the Ukraine being a natural dais for this purpose. Therefore
while the Kremlin cannot afford to liberalize, it faces
increasing its problems by not doing so.
The autocratic system of government in which electors
mobilize support for the regime's policy and don't legitimize
its rule imposes a strange pattern of demands on Soviet
foreign policy.

It has been theorized that due to the

"insecurities of dictatorial power" the party has a vested
interest in maintaining an atmosphere of tension internationally,
The Politburo is seen to need a climate of permanent emergency
to justify its monopoly of power.

Amalrik observes:

A regime [withl such an ideology needs
internal enemies who are not so much
'class' enemies as national enemies
(for instance, Chinese and Jews).
Such
a nationalistic ideology, although it
may prove termporarily useful to the
regime, is very dangerous for a country
in which those of the Russian nationality constitute less than half the total population.^
M. Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.:
Domestic Factors (Riverside: Dickenson Pub. Co., 1975), p. 138
4
A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 38.
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How serious is this identification crisis of the
Communist Party?

Amalrik, the Russian historian, has drawn

some interesting historical parallels between ]917 and the
present:
A cast-ridden and immobile society, a rigid
governmental system which openly clashes with
the need for economic development, general
bureaucratization and the existence of a
privileged bureaucratic class, and national
animosities within a multinational state in
which certain nations enjoy privileged status.
Richard Pipes of Harvard argues that the only mandate
the Bolshevik regime does have, is derived

from history

(the claim that it represents the vanguard of the majestic
force of progress whose mission it is to accomplish the final
social revolution in human history).

Thus, the regime cannot

accept the status quo of the international system as permanent
since this would be giving up the historical mandate to further
the revolutxon. 6
- the question of legitimacy would at once
crop up. For indeed, who has given the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union the
right to monopolise the country's political
authority as well as its human and material
resources.'
The legitimacy problem can only be attenuated by an
active self-seeking foreign policy behaviour on the part of
the Soviet elite.

This stance is compatible with the political

self-interest of the ruling elite, and the historical drive
of Russian expansion.
A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive
op. cit., p. 43..

....,

Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," in Commentary
April 1980, p. 32.
Ibid., p. 3 2.
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Thus ideology, political survival and
economic exigencies reinforce one another
impelling Russia toward conquest. Each
new territory acquired becomes part of the
national "patrimony" and is, sooner or
later, incorporated into the homeland.
Each demands a "buffer" to protect it from
real or imaginary enemies, until it, too,
becomes part of the homeland, and in turn,
requires its own buffer.8
The vindication of the Soviet state becomes expansion
of its power, which serves as a deception for the failure of
the realization of Bolshevik social programs.

Emphasis is

placed by party ideologies on the importance of building
Communism in the USSR on and influencing the course of the entire
development of the world.
The legitimacy problem has overtones which account for
much of the seriousness of both the nationalities
economy problems.

and

We shall therefore not end our discussion

of this problem here but rather pick it up again where
applicable in the next two problem areas to be examined.

In

the final section we will discuss how this problem will
influence trends in the foreign policy of the USSR.

The Nationalities Problem
A minority is discontented not because
there is no national union but because
it does not enjoy the right to use its
native language and the discontent
will pass of itself ... give it its
own schools and all grounds for
discontent will disappear.
Stalin 9
R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," op. cit., p. 32.
9
Practice

Quoted in R. Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in
(New York: Praeger Pub., 1967), p. 8.
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Many ethnic groups have acquired a persistent

grudge

against the Soviet regime which, despite Lenin's efforts,has
taken over the Tsarist legacy.

Things were made worse still

in some areas by the Nazi occupation.

Either because they were

anti-Soviet, or for purely nationalistic motives, large parts
of the Ukraine collaborated with the invaders.

The warmth

with which the German troops were received came as a severe
blow to the Russians: it proved that ethnic minorities could
become a fifth column.

There is the same distrust of the

three Baltic republics, the last to be incorporated in the
Soviet Union where the resistance to Russian influence is
increasingly taking the form of an upsurge in religion.
The situation is complicated even more because of the
jealousy between some ethnic minorities and the Russian
community.

For historical and cultural reasons

groups

like the Baits, the Georgians, and the Armenians have a higher
standard of living than the Russians.

They are entitled to

exemptions that Moscow refuses Russians.

Caucasian peasants,

for example, are allowed to get rich supplying the 'Kolkhoz'
markets in Moscow and Leningrad.
The focus of the nationality problem for Moscow is now
centred in Central Asia, where the nationalities problem is
one of demographics:
... a marked dichotomy has existed over
about the last two decades between the
nationalities of the Eastern USSR, which
are characterized by low rates of
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growth, and the nationalities of the
Caucasus and Central Asia, which have
~
evinced high rates of population increase.
The birthrate is declining in European Russia, contributing
to an acute labour shortage.

But in Soviet Central Asia,

the birthrate of non-Russians is rising.
economic dislocation are likely to result.

Ethnic tensions and
It is not likely

that Soviet Asians will migrate to European Russia voluntarily.
This traditional "stay at home" attitude
makes it unlikely that the accumulating
Moslem surplus will voluntarily disperse
through emigration to other parts of the
Soviet Union. If they do not emigrate
demographic pressures within the region
cannot but inflame the ethnic conflict,
given the fact that the Moslems are
largely rural, the non-Moslem immigrants
urban.H
Unless Soviet leaders build up non-Russian areas, the industrial
economy will run out of workers.

If they do invest,the new

Central Asian elite which has emerged will be better placed
to challenge the ethnic Russians for political control.

The

Russians are well aware that the Central Asian republics
"have the economic and institutional base, the infrastructure
and the political elites to assume an independent

statehood.

Thus the Soviet republics are essentially more viable as
independent states than some of the Asian and African
Ralph S. Clem, "Recent Demographic Trends Among Soviet
Nationalities and Their Implications," in Nationalism in the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe: in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin
edited by George W. Simmonds (Detroit: Univ. of Detroit Press,
1977) , p. 37 .
Theresa Harmstone, "Nationalism in Soviet Cental As.ia
Since 1964," in Nationalism in the U.S.S.R. edited by Simmonds,
op. cit., p. 27.
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,,12
count ries .

Further,

... the cultural nationalism is already there
and its political impact gains momentum with
the entry into the political arena of increasingly aggressive and rapidly growing
national communist elites. Social and economic
pressures are building up fast spurred by the
demographic explosion. These will accelerate
as Moslem youth overcomes the traditional
inertia and starts moving through the system
of technical training that begins to open up
- into urban and industrial centers and
into direct competition with immigrants.
The movement has already begun.13
The imperialist nature of Russian domination is
personified by their concentration in urban areas; they dominate the capital cities.

"By way of contrast only one in every

four to six Moslems is urbanized."

14

The use of the Russian

language "is the primary vehicle of Soviet national

integration

... [however] in Central Asia almost three fourths of the
native peoples are unfamiliar with the language.

In practical

terms this means that their social and political mobility,
even in their own ethnic areas, is severely restricted."

Most

analysts feel that the Soviet effort to "Russify" the nonRussian nationalities has failed; "the rate of their national
self-assertion exceeds the rate of their assimilation into
i
«.
.,16
a common value
system.
12
13

Harmstone, "Nationalism in Soviet

....," op . cit., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 277.

14 Ibid . , p. 2 7 7.
15
Theresa Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in
the USSR," in Nationalism in the U.S.S.R. edited by Simmonds,
op. cit., p. 25.
16
lb id. , p. 32
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The ascendance of:
Cultural nationalism has serious political
overtones. The newly-found national pride
and self-respect throws into question the
hitherto unchallenged cultural "superiority"
of the Russians and their political role
as well.17
The Soviet elite are faced with defending the status
quo by a return to an imperialist state based on Russian
nationalism.

This is where the legitimacy claim of the

C.P.S.U. has no firm foundation.

Because

"Marxism-Leninism

postulates that a class and not a nation is the basis of
political unity, the foundation of political integration of
a communist state is provided by 'proletarian
and not by nationalism."

internationalism

18

The leadership's earlier hopes that the process of
Soviet development over time would
away has not been realized.

wither ethnic nationalism

Indeed, the aggravation of ethnic

tensions on nationality lines "threatens the most potent
unifying and legitimizing systemic force within Soviet society
the great power nationalism, which primarily accounts for the
political stability of the Soviet state."

19

The nationality problem accounts for the Soviet elite
not being able to decentralize the economy.

Because,

The nationality problem and the danger of
its intensification, adds another dimension
17 Harmstone, "Nationalism in Soviet Asia ....," op. cit
p. 286
18 Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics
op . cit. , p. 32.
32
19 S. Bialer, "The Soviet Political Elite .
p. 44.

, op. cit .
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to, and greatly complicates, many of the
administrative and political dilemmas which
the Party faces. Most important in this
respect is the superimposition of the ethnic
dimension over the Party's dilemma in the
field of economic organization. There the need
for greater economic effectiveness generates
pressure for decentralization, which in turn,
however, clashes with the Party's fear that
it will lead to loss of political control.20
The nationality problem and the fear it generates in
Russians, reinforces the traditional internal authoritarianism
and centralization of decision making.

Where once the enemy

was outside, it is now inside the empire and a highly centralized regime is once again necessitated.

This fear of non-

Russians inside the empire is the major break on the evolution
of the Soviet system away from authoritarianism.

There is

little chance that a major change in leadership inside the
C.P.S.U. would differ on this course.

Differences can only

be of style not substance; the Russians are prisoners of their
culture and history.

The Islamic Revival
People of Moslem stock live mainly in six southern
republics of the Soviet Union: Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan,
Turkmenistan and Kirghizia, which make up Soviet Central Asia,
plus the vast steppeland of Kazakhstan and the republic of
Azerbaijan.
Russia.

Tartar Moslems also live around Kazan in Central

The Tartars are descended from the Mongol hordes and

the Uzbeks from the heirs of Tamurlane.
20
p. 44.

S. Bialer, "The Soviet Political Elite

....," op. cit.,
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Central Asia was the last area to be conquered by
Tsarist Russia, with the final frontiers of empire established
only 100 years ago.

Thus, Moscow's grip on its Moslem commu-

nities could be threatened by the interest the new leaders of
Iran are showing in their Moslem brothers across their nation's
northern border.

There are 40 million Moslems in the two

regions of the Soviet Union that flank Iran.

They not only

share religion with their Iranian neighbours but they also
speak Iranian and Turkic languages.
The Soviets have gone to great lengths to make the
colonial status of the Central Asiatic Republics less evident;
some of these efforts have benefited

the local populations.

Yet Moscow cannot escape the anomaly that, in the contemporary
world of sovereign nation-states, Central Asia and the Caucasus
remain among the few sizeable areas and populations still
ruled by aliens.

Not much has been heard from these areas

in the past century, but this is probably about to be changed.
The Moslems are no longer isolated.

Because of a much higher

birthrate than the ethnic Europeans, the Moslem population is
rising at a phenomenal r a t e — a n d could be 100 million by the
end of the century.
Khomeini has expressed concern at the fate of the
Moslems of Central Asia.

By raising the issue of Islam in the

Soviet Union, he gives support to Moslems there and brings
attention to their cause.

Therefore if a stable Islamic

government evolves in Iran, it could cause the Soviets a lot
of trouble.

In any analysis of the invasion of Afghanistan,
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the defensive motive on the part of the Soviet elite, should
not be underplayed.

The Russians are well aware of their

position as colonial masters.
Further complicating the nationalities problem is
the outside interference, not solely from Islamic interests
but also actions on the part of the USSR's rival, the U.S.

21

The Americans are using broadcasts in seven languages by
"Voice of America" and "Radio Liberty" to exacerbate this
Soviet problem.

The Americans see the ethnic groups as

vulnerable over time to splitting tactics or, if you wish, to
open, friendly, peacable appeals to the ethnic's 'human rights'
The U.S. hopes to increase the cost to the Kremlin of keeping
them in line, and to identify the U.S. as sympathetic to their
Islamic longings.
Richard Pipes points out the gravity of the
'Nationality

Problem':

... all the evidence available from within
the Soviet Union itself and from historic
parallels with other countries indicates
that nationalism of the minority peoples
of the USSR (like that of the Russians
themselves) has grown and intensified since
1917. There is a great deal of nationalist
frustration in the Soviet Union. Unless
the Soviet rulers face up to it and begin the
process of decentralization voluntarily, it
is likely someday to explode in a most
destructive manner.22
21
The Guardian, Brzezinski Aims to Reach Soviet Moslems,
Jan. 20, 1980.
22
Richard Pipes, "Solving the Nationality Problem" in
Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1973), p. 513.
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The Soviet elite faces a problem that can only increase
as the unrealized expectations in the economic and political
sectors present the non-Russians with the evidence that the
Russians have no intention to move from the status quo.
Increasingly, the Russians will be forced to fall back on a
'Great Power' posture to provide a legitimizing basis for
Russian political control of the empire.

This posture will

necessarily call for aggressive, belligerent directions in
Soviet foreign policy.

The Economic Problem
It is as if the Soviet leaders and the
people have entered into an unwritten
contract by which the former guarantee
a minimum revenue for a modicum of
work in return for the latter's
undertaking not to interfere
in politics.
23
Amalric
After several decades of diminishingly rapid growth,
Soviet industry is now running into serious difficulty.

Rising

raw material costs, impending energy shortages, slower growth
in the supply of labour and capital and sluggish productivity
are all pointers to a limping industry in the 1980s.

In 1979

the Soviet Union realized its lowest peacetime growth rate
s ince the 19 30s.
The combination of sluggish industrial growth
with a bad harvest, near-stagnant livestock
production, and transport and construction
23
Jacques Amalric, "The Soviet Union at 60," Atlas
World Press Review, Feb. '78, p. 20.
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bottlenecks, resulted in an increment of only
1.9 percent in the USSR's official measure
of 'national income utilized'. Westernstyle GNP measures would almost certainly
yield a lower figure.24
In the 1980s the Soviet Union faces a major problem in
trying to meet the pervasive need for change.

Its system is

simply too rigid for modern economic conditions.

In the

past growth has been based partially on increased

labour

productivity.

This has tailed off and increased

incentives

and looser controls might increase productivity, but for ideological reasons, they are unlikely to be adopted.

Until

recently the Russians had enough men and resources to achieve
planned growth, however wastefully.

They are in no position

to do this anymore as labour in industrial areas is becoming
scarce.

Given the demands of a modern economy the Soviets

need to decentralize the command structure of the economy but
for reasons of protecting the legitimacy of the C.P.S.U. this
u

•

-ui

25

becomes impossible.
Proposed solutions to economic p r o b l e m s — a

return to

Stalin's model of forced growth, or a massive flow of capital
and technology from the West--would have dramatic political
consequences.

So the Soviet Union's do-nothing policy persists

The probable result will be a decline in Soviet political
power and inevitably, difficulties at home or with its
satellites as goods become more scarce. Soviet military power
'Quarterly Economic Review of the U.S.S.R." produced
by The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. (London: Spencer
House, 1980), p. 11.
25
As discussed previously, the hegemony over the nonRussian nationalities could be shattered if a process of libera
zation were to gain momentum.
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and a return to a strict police state will be necessary to
protect the legitimacy of the C.P.S.U. as the decision-making
organ of the ruling elite.
An ever-increasing burden on the Soviet economy is the
defense industry, it exacts a heavy share of the total resources
of the economy.

Armaments produced in the USSR represent

one-third of all machine products, one-fifth of all metallurgical
one_sixth of all chemical products.

products, and

one-sixth of all energy resources.

7 f\

They consume

There is little chance

however that the Soviet elite will cut back its armaments
production.

According to Mr. Donald Green, an American analyst,

even if Soviet defense expenditures were frozen at 4 percent a
year, the extra growth from the arms freeze would be only 0.1
percent a year.

So why bother?

27

The most important factor, stopping the Soviet elite from
cutting back its armaments expenditure, is that it would weaken
the Soviet Union's principal claim to being a superpower.

It

is clear that the Soviet Union in the 1980s will not be able
to compete as a world economic power with the U.S., the Common
Market, or Japan.
The agriculture sector of the economy is in continually
bad shape.

The Kremlin has been pumping investment into

agriculture

(at a rate of 340 billion rouble or 500 billion

dollars in the last 15 years)

28

yet it still has to import

9 f\

Atlas World Press Review, Feb. 1979.
27
The Economist, Russia into the 1980s, Dec. 29/79.
Ibid .
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grain.

The collective farms are an economic disaster.

Much

of the nation's farmland lies too far north to be very productive, and large grain crops depend on unusually good
weather.

As in industry, Soviet farms would also benefit from

flexible planning and individual initiative.
The private household plots run by over
40 million families in the USSR still
provide around a quarter of the nation's
food supply, despite severe restrictions
on their size and operation.29
Certainly the most critical problem facing the Soviet
economy is an energy shortage.
some alarming forecasts.

The CIA presented to Congress

The CIA predicts that production

will peak this year or next at about 12 million barrels a dayand that it could drop by one-third by the mid-'80s.

30

Quoting from the CIA report:
Optimistically assuming domestic oil production
of 10 million barrels a day in '85, net oil
imports from the west would reach more than
3 million barrels a day if domestic requirements were fully met and exports to Communist
countries were maintained at projected 1980
levels of 1.9 million barrels a day. These
imports would cost the Soviets more than $20
billion at June '79 oil prices and would
imply a shift in the trade balance of some
$25 billion in current prices, almost twice
Moscow's present earnings on commodity trade
with the West .... Oil imports of this
magnitude would obviously exhaust Soviet
hard currency resources.31
The Russian economy needs to find within four years at
least two million barrels per day just to match 1980 levels.
29
"Quarterly Economic Review of the ....," op. cit., p
30
H.E. Meyer, "Why We Should Worry About The Soviet
Energy Crunch," in Fortune, Feb. 25, 1980.
Ibid .
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This would be a very hard task for a rich nation of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development; for the
Russians who lack hard currency it is probably impossible.
The Western nations are scrambling to assure increased supplies;
this further reduced Soviet chances of obtaining needed energy
supplies.
The Soviet oil industry is technologically very backward.

According to Arthur A. Meyerhoff, a Tulsa-based con-

sultant who specializes in Soviet oil production, the Russians
are nearly thirty years behind

their American counterparts.

Soviet crews need an entire year to drill wells to a depth of
10,000 f e e t — a job that American crews complete on average in
thirty-four days.

32

There seems little chance that the Soviets will be
able to maintain their present oil production.

It is estimated

that oil production will peak this year or next and then
decline.
Soviet supply problems are compounded by problems of
logistics; ninety percent of future on-shore supplies lie
east of the Ural Mountains in the remote wastes of Siberia
and the deserts of Kazakhstan.

Yet 80 percent of all Soviet

energy is consumed thousands of miles away in the western part
of the country.

Older Soviet oil fields on the Caspian Sea

are near exhaustion, and the most promising newer fields in
Western Siberia have already peaked.

The Soviets must tap

32 H.E. Meyer, "Why We Should Worry

....," op. cit
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known reserves in more remote areas of Siberia.

That will

be costly and unpopular with the long-suffering neglected
consumer since resources in increasing amounts will be poured
into finding fuel and power at the expense of the housing
and consumer goods sector'.
Russia has vast potential oil reserves in the Arctic,
in Western Siberia, and off-shore, but the exploration of
these is at least a decade away.

Most of the oil for the

1980s will have to come from existing fields and from new fields
in areas already under production.

Implications of the Energy Crisis
Serious oil production problems would probably force
the Soviet Union to cut exports of its Eastern-bloc allies,
which now depend on the USSR for two million barrels per day.
That would compel the Eastern bloc to turn to the world market,
generating new competition for OPEC supplies.

If by the mid-'80s

the Soviet Union does find itself obliged to import oil from
OPEC nations to keep its COMECON allies supplied--as the CIA
predicts--it will face a huge import bill.

Even if the Soviet

Union charged the East Europeans a good deal more for their
oil, and boosted its gas and machinery exports to the West,
it would still be landed with a large trade gap.

Oil may face

Soviet leaders with a choice between economic and political
stability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union's continued
ability to import Western grain and technology.
Therefore the energy crisis will have other

far-reaching
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implications.

Reduced Soviet oil exports to Eastern Europe

may result in political instability there.

A cutback in oi]

sales to the West will deprive the USSR of the hard currency
it desperately needs to pay for sophisticated Western
technology.
Most Western analysts are convinced that the Soviet
Union simply cannot afford to cut back the one million barrels
a day it now exports to the West; much of the nation's hard
currency comes from such sales.

Rather than lose that cash,

which is badly needed for the purchase of food and technology,
the Soviet government will probably decide to shortchange energy
consumers at home.

This will lead to further domestic unrest

on the part of the long-suffering Soviet consumer.
"Hawks" in the West draw ominous conclusions from the
Soviet short term energy crisis.

They see

the problems of

access and supply as urgent if the Soviet Union
is to remain stable.

[Russian Empire]

Thus, they see Moscow strategists as

planning to counterbalance falling domestic oil production
with cheap access to foreign oil.

The Persian Gulf is seen

as the Kremlin's target, the supply route for 30% of America's
oil, 65% of Western Europe's, and over 70% of Japan's.

33

Undoubtedly the Kremlin is well aware of its future oil
shortage, and also of the declining

production-to-reserves

ratio in comparison to its rival, the United States.

The U.S.

has nearby Mexico and Venezuela, a majority of OPEC states more
33
Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West,"
Foreign Affairs, .Winter '79, p. 109.
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or less united against communism, and the probability of a
breakthrough on tar-sands as the price rises.

This all gives

the U.S. an edge over a USSR shortage of both hard currency
and the high level technology needed to develop new Siberian
oil fields locked under the ice thousands of miles from the
USSR's big cities.

34

Hard-liners feel sure that the Soviets must then have
a plan to move into the Gulf, while the opportunity presents
itself.
Unwilling to run the risks of muddling
through with less oil, unable to buy more
oil in the open market the Russians may
have no choice but to go for the third
option - to try to take whatever oil they
will need without paying for it.35
Can the West stop the Soviets?

The Kremlin may well feel

it has such a preponderance of conventional and nuclear arms
during its "window of opportunity"--1982-1986--that

it can

afford to take extreme measures to safeguard its perceived
interests.

"One benefit of being number one is that you need

not stand by helplessly while your economy grinds to a halt
and your empire disintegrates."
Publicists and experts like Richard Nixon and Edward
Luttwak view Soviet moves in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and now
Afghanistan, as preparing groundwork for an advance on the
oil fields of the Middle East.
34 Carter's ban on the export of high technology could
backfire.
35 H.E. Meyer, "Why We Should Worry
36

Ibid.

op. cit.
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China: The External Threat

can see in the murky twilight
new Mongol warriors with bombs in their quivers
if they attack the alarm bells will ring
there will be more than enough fighters
a new battle of Kuilkovo.
Yevtushenko,
On the Red Snow of the Ussuri

The Russian thinks and sees China through the prism of
Russian culture and history.

Russian history is filled with a

thousand years of fighting and war with yellow-skinned warriors.
He may confuse Mongol with Chinese, but the emotional attitudes
fixed in his childhood and reinforced through his adult life
have conditioned him to fear the "yellow peril."

The passage

quoted above from Yevtushenko's chauvinistic poem indicates to
the Russian mind the Chinese are the new Mongols, at whose
hands the Russians suffered for more than three centuries.
They may be Uzbek, they may be Mongol, or they
may be the Han people of China. To the
Russian they are all the same. He does not
distinguish between the Mongols who ravaged
his land 600 years ago and the masses of
China whom he believes are standing just
beyond the low hills of Asia ready to attack
again, silent, secretly, without warning.1
How real is this perceived threat to the Soviet Union?
Well, in the long run Moscow's power is probably
away.

slipping

When, in a couple of decades, the USSR is faced with a

China of comparable military and industrial power sitting on
Harrison Salisbury, War Between Russia and China
(New York: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 18.
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its southern frontier, its ability to exert pressure on anybody else in the world will be all but non-existent.

The

Soviet Union has an abysmally unproductive agriculture, a
lot of aging, very inefficient heavy industry, and only a
few highly privileged and coddled sectors like defense and
space research that can compete with the rest of the world.
China, on the other hand, is the mother of all the East Asian
cultures.

The o t h e r s — T a i w a n , South Korea, Japan, have

realized outstanding growth rates, and are collectively the
economic success story of the world.

A China that can realize

20 years of economic growth approaching the rate of these
countries will enable the Chinese to develop armed forces
comparable to those of the Soviet Union or in fact, greater.
Will the Chinese, once they have strengthened

their

armed forces, utilize these forces against the Soviets?
answer could be "yes".

2

The

Demographic statistics indicate the

Chinese population will number close to two billion, early
in the next century.

The Chinese could very well be con-

fronted with the dilemma of starve or fight.

The Chinese have

been having a good deal of success with their agricultural
effort, but given the vagaries of climate, a couple of bad
crops could bring on a crisis situation.

The Chinese then

would really have no alternative, particularly not when food
and food-producing areas lie on their perimeter and when thousands
of square miles of those areas once were theirs by right of
2 In terms of available military resources which can be
brought to bear in a situation; presumably the Kremlin would
not strip all of its forces from the West to send to the East.
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tribute and subjection.

Therefore, on the basis of dire

economic circumstances the Chinese could be compeled to expand
at the expense of the Soviet Union.
For China to regain its past dominant role in Asia,
she must take back certain lands from the USSR.

Formerly,

the large, lightly populated territories of Siberia and the
Soviet maritime provinces were once part of China's sphere of
influence.

Now, of course, these territories have been in-

corporated into the Soviet Union, the incorporation of which •
has made that state China's main rival for the position of
dominant actor in Asia.
It is essential for China somehow to elimiate
or neutralize this rival if she is to play a
dominant role in Asia and the world at large.
Any discussion of China's ability to expand at the
expense of the Soviet Union is dependent on China's ability to
modernize and achieve a growth rate similar to Japan.

Is

it realistic to expect China to match the economic growth
rate of Japan?

Yes, particularly

since Japan will provide

much of the capital and technology while China has the raw
resources and the abundant cheap labour.

In August 1978

the Chinese and Japanese took the historic step of signing a
peace and friendship treaty, containing a clause which
obliquely condemned Soviet hegemony.

For China,this is a

treaty of immense significance; it creates the prerequisites
for coordinating China's vast manpower resources and Japan's
Andre Amalrik, Will The Soviet Union Survive Until
1984? , op. cit. , p. 47.
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economic potential.

Both countries see this treaty as the

basis for huge Japanese investments to modernize and industrialize China.
... the Chinese have actually built Japan
into their economic plan. They have taken
a calculating look at the Japanese economy,
at the desire of Japanese businessmen to
trade with China, and at areas of complimentarity between Chinese and Japanese
economics, and simply regard Japan as part
of the plan ... there are other factors of
mutual attraction not unlike those which
resulted in the E.E.C. The future of
North Asia will be one in which China and
,
Japan form the nucleus of the new Asian E.C.
There is little doubt in Soviet minds that Peking hopes
its new relationship with Japan will develop into an antiSoviet military alliance with .a re-armed Japan.

The Soviet

journal International Affairs warns that Chinese leaders'
emphasis on "common interests" with Japan is an elaborate
strategic plan "for demarcating these countries' spheres of
influence in Asia, isolating the USSR blocking and undermining its position in Southeast Asia and Pacific states."
The journal notes that Chinese leaders are urging Japanese
military circles "to extend the military ties between the
two countries' armed forces, assuring Japan of their approval
of its line for a military build-up with the U.S.A. ,thus coming
out in support of Japanese militarism."
S. FitzGerald, "China a Stabilizing Force?," in Atlantic
Community Quarterly, Vol. 17 1979, p. 43.
Y. Semyono, "Peking's Policy Constitutes A Military
Threat," in International Affairs (Moscow) April '79, p. 71.
Ibid. , p. 71.
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The same Soviet journal in a different article, sees
U.S. support for the Sino-Japanese treaty as a U.S. attempt
to "tie Peking to the West

[and! that the Treaty is in keeping

with the present U.S. global strategy of using China and
Japan in the interests of American policy in the Far East
Hi.e., an anti-Soviet alliance in AsiaJ."
The Soviets may feel that their worries of an antiSoviet alliance were confirmed by Deng Xiaoping's visit to
Japan immediately after his trip to the U.S.A., and VicePresident Mondale's stop-over in Japan on his return from
China in August 1979.
Certainly the Soviets take this threat seriously;
Q

Dr. Georg

Arbatov

senior advisor on foreign affairs of an

incipient anti-Soviet alliance comprising the U.S., Japan,
9
the People's Republic, and NATO."
He further warned "If such
an axis is built on an anti-Soviet basis then there is no
place for detente, even in a narrow sense."
Chinese territorial claims worry the Soviet leadership
for reasons which transcend simply security interests.

These

claims threaten the legitimacy of Soviet rule over lands once
ruled by Russian Tsars.

If Peking has no right to rule over

the indigenous populations of the disputed territories merely
C. Apalin, "Peking, The West and Detente," in
International Affairs (Moscow), Feb. '79, p. 51.
Q

Interview by J. Power with Dr. Georg Arbatov in London
Observer, Nov. 12 '78.
9

Ibid.

10 T , .,
Ibid .

65
because they were once part of the Chinese empire, on what
basis does the USSR retain lands and boundaries which
correspond

to Imperial Russia?

Therefore, Chinese claims and

Soviet responses ascerbate the legitimacy problem of the
C.P.S.U.
The China problem has further ramifications for the
legitimacy problem of the C.P.S.U.

As one Russian historian

observed:
The need for an ideological underpinning
forces the regime to look toward a new
ideology, namely, Great Russian nationalism,
with its characteristic cult of strength
and expansionist a m b i t i o n s . !
China becomes a useful means for providing a plausible
and probable enemy for a desired end.

In the long run, as

Amalrik notes, this reliance on "Great Russian nationalism"
is very dangerous in a state where the Russian nationality
will constitute less than half the total population.
If war is inevitable as both the Chinese and Soviets
profess, is it logical to expect the Russians to wait until
the Chinese are considerably stronger?

For the present, the

USSR enjoys significant all-around military superiority in
the Eurasian land mass.

The future is uncertain; the Soviet

Union could be faced with encirclement by acombination of
the United States, a re-armed Japan, a mobilized Western
Europe, and a greatly strengthened China.

For the Soviet

Union not to act to prevent this serious threat from maturing
A. Amalrik,
op. cit., p. 38.

Will the Soviet Union Survive

....,
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would be inconsistent with a remarkably consistent pattern of
expansion by Moscow (over the last six centuries) when faced
with a grave external threat to the empire.
In a relatively short time-span, when China has augmented its forces to preclude a nuclear attack and strengthened
its conventional forces, the Soviets would face a long, protracted military conflict if war were to occur.

It is

probable that the Soviets would end up having to transfer
much of their military forces to the Far East,in which event
the USSR's ability to look after its interests in Eastern
Europe would be greatly diminished.

Amalrik speculates that:

Germany will surely be reunited ... a reunited Germany with a fairly pronounced
anti-Soviet orientation will create an
entirely new situation in Europe ...
several countries at least, such as
Hungary
and Rumania,
will promptly
follow
Hungary and
Kumania, will
prompi
their pro-German orientation.12
Amalrik further speculates that as the war would progress
Russian nationalism would decline while non-Russian nationalism
would rise.

13

Eventually a moral weariness with a war waged

far away and for no apparent reason, and increasing discontent
about the economy, would lead to strong dissatisfaction with
the regime on the part of the middle class.

In short, the

regime could face a revolution similar to thatof 1917 in its
roots.
Clearly, the Soviet elite has good reason to be concerned, and might feel that the China problem must be taken
12
A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive
op. cit., p. 60.
13 Ibid., p. 62
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care of while the Soviet Union has a military preponderance
vis a vis China and any alliances China may forge. The Soviet
leadership must not allow the USSR to become embroiled in a
war with China at a time of its choice.
In the mid-seventies, events occurring along the arc
extending from the Horn of Africa to Southeast Asia served
to convince the Chinese leadership that the U.S. lacked the
national will to check Soviet moves directed toward effecting
a change in the global balance of power.

Groups in both China

and America concurring with this assessment worked

towards

effecting normalization of relations with the desired end
of restraining Moscow.

"Each thought the other would add

strength to its own international position."
of relations occurred in January of 1979.

14

Normalization

The strongest U.S.

statement of support for the new relationship and its real
purpose was delivered by Vice-President Mondale in a speech
in Peking on August 27 of 1979.

He stated:

Despite the sometimes profound differences
between our two systems, we are committed
to joining you to advance our many parallel
strategies and bilateral interests. Thus,
any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate
you in world affairs assumes a stance counter
to American interests.15
There were no doubts in Soviet minds what Mondale
meant by common interests.

The Soviet Journal International

Affairs stated "It is an open secret that these 'interests'
W.R. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle of 'Two and a
Half Powers'," Ofbis, Fall of '79, Vol. 23, p. 526.
15 Ibid., p. 528.
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stand for joint action against the USSR and its allies."
It further elaborates that "the Vice-President's

1 f\

declarations

to the effect that 'any nation which seeks to weaken or
isolate' China were a political overture to Peking of a
clearly anti-Soviet nature."
For the Soviets the most ominous aspect of the new
relationship between the U.S. and China, is arm sales to the
Peoples Republic, which serve to modernize Chinese armed
forces.

The Soviets see the Carter Administration, while

officially against arms sales to China, "abetting its NATO
allies signing military deals with the Chinese and allowing
them to sell certain types of modern weaponry."

18

Soviet

fears in this regard were escalated by U.S. Defense Secretary
Harold Brown's visit to China in January of 1980 where he
discussed expanding bilateral relations in military and
political spheres with high echelon Chinese leaders.

Brown

promised the Chinese a ground-based station for receiving
and processing various information sent by the U.S. Landsat
satellite; he also committed the U.S. to help modernize the
19
Chinese Navy, and supply the Chinese with modern computers.
In the Soviet mind, this trip of Brown's "is yet another
W. Kuzmin, "China in Washington's Aggressive Policy,"
International Affairs (Moscow) April 1980, p. 36.
17

Ibid., p. 36

18
No Author, "Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and
Alliance with Imperialism," International Affairs (Moscow),
March 1980, p. 53.
19 W. Kuzmin, "China in Washington's
,"op. cit., p. 37.
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indication of the anti-Soviet basis of American Chinese
relat xons.

„20

While the Soviet Union is greatly concerned and
annoyed with the new U.S.-China relationship, it has not been
an unexpected development.

The Soviets have seen China as a

de facto ally of the U.S. for several years preceding the
normalization of relations between Peking and Washington.
To quote an official Soviet source:
The Peking leaders and the NATO bosses,
finding increasing common-ground in their
hostility to detente ... are drifting
towards an alliance in which China would
play the unseemly role of NATO's military
outpost in the Far East. General Alexander
Haig, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe, said in December '77 that tension
on the Soviet-Chinese border was 'a clear
benefit to us in purely military terms.'
Later he referred to China as 'NATO's
16th member.'21
The Soviets saw this statement as indicative of the
de facto nature of China-U.S. .relations whether
or not on the part of U.S. leaders.

formalized

The Chinese view of U.S.

China relations previous to normalization was taken by the
Soviets to be represented by an interview which Deng Xiaoping
gave on May 19, 1978 to UPI in which he "agreed with the
opinion of the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, M. Mansfield, that
China is 'the Eastern Nato'."

22

It is very possible that the U.S. in its attempt at
using the so-called "China-Card" to preserve stability in the
W. Kuzmin, "China in Washington's

....," op. cit., p

G. Apalxn, "Peking, the West, and Detente," op. cit.,
p. 54.
22
Ibid., p. 54.
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International system has not fully considered the ramifications
which could result.

23

This ploy could easily backfire.

The

U.S., agreeing publicly to supply some military equipment
(trucks, satellite station, etc.) to China, is bound to
strengthen the argument of hard liners inside the Kremlin
to move on the China problem."

24

One western correspondent

in Moscow came upon very ominous tidings and reported on the
possibility of the USSR launching a pre-emptive strike against
China.
There are signs that America's decision to
help China modernize its military forces
has reinforced all the latent fears of Soviet
strategic planners about the Chinese threat
to the Soviet Union ... There has always been
speculation that the Soviet Union might try to
move against China before it could become an
effective nuclear power. In the view of
some Soviet analysts, these arguments have
acquired far more urgency now.25
What tends to reinforce and substantiate this correspondent's report was an official Soviet journal's ominous
warning less than one month afterwards.

"An intensified

23
In their haste they may have overlooked an old
strategic maxim--"What are the intentions of your new partner."
See W. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle ....," op. cit., p. 530.
24
It is believed in many circles (in the West) that the
Soviets considered a nuclear strike against certain targets
inside China in 1969, but were discouraged partly by U.S. disapproval. The Soviets considered the moment opportune for what
might have been from their perspective a "surgical strike",
i.e. ending China's potential for waging a future nuclear war
against the Soviet Union.
25
Hella Pick, "Options for the Kremlin in West and
East," in the Guardian, Feb. 10/80.
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struggle against the plots being hatched by the Peking leaders,
imperialist reactionaries and militaristic circles in the
West is naturally becoming particularly urgent."

2 fi

A Soviet move at dealing with the China problem is
dependent on Soviet estimates of how quickly- China can field
modern armed forces.

This timetable is bound to be accelerated

by any U.S. military aid to China of a substantive nature.
Also, recent Soviet successes in Ethiopia and Afghanistan may
create an atmosphere of optimism and confidence on the part
of Soviet leaders regarding the ability of their armed forces.
It is possible that Soviet military leaders may be able to
convince the leaders of the Kremlin that the armed forces
of the USSR could with a quick move against China "shatter an
incipient US-PRC-JAP-NATO encirclement before it is too late „27
China has actively and .stridently been warning the
U.S. and its allies of what it perceives as Soviet strategic
goals—namely, the annexation of Middle Eastern oil and
neutralization of Western Europe.

The Chinese feel the Soviets

are encircling China by putting pressure on Pakistan and India,
allying with Vietnam and dominating North Korea.

28

The .

Chinese fear that once the Soviets remove or diminish the
threat of a Western front they will feel secure in moving against
China.

Vice-Premiere Deng Xiaoping warned "if we really want
26 No Author, "Peking's Foreign
27

....," op. cit., p. 55.

W. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle

28 Ibid . , p. 525 .

....," op. cit. p. 525
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to be able to place curbs on the Polar Bear, the only
29
realistic thing for us to do is unite."
To that end the
Chinese are doing their best to draw the U.S. into a firm
commitment to aid China in what they see as an inevitable
war with the USSR.

To achieve this end the Chinese could seek

to provide the Soviets with an excuse for an attack which
would cause severe destruction in China and possibly the loss
of much Chinese territory.
a drastic course?

Why would the Chinese pursue such

They are concerned with the long-term

danger from the Soviet Union so they might seek to implement
an old Chinese strategic maxim:
The classical military planner who has
read Sun Tzu knows that any action forcing
an adversary to undertake a plan of action
prematurely constitutes a sound strategic
move.30
The Chinese further realize that a Soviet move against
China will tilt the balance of power significantly with
detente being shattered and probable Western mobilization.

31

The Chinese are confident that in the long run they will beat
the Soviets because of their greatest strength: manpower.
The Chinese know that the Soviets are
weakest where they are strongest - in
manpower. If the Chinese have sufficient
time to mobilize and arm that strength,
they will one day be able to deal with
the Soviet threat. Hence, they are willing
to accept a serious, but not mortal, defeat
now in order to gain a future victory. 32
29
Time Magazine, Feb. 5, 1979.
30

W. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle

532
31 Ibid., p. 5 33
32
Ibid. , p. 533

op . cit. ,
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The Chinese by provoking and drawing a Soviet armed
response, will achieve two goals: (1) a mobilized West;
(2) drawing the USSR into a long-range protracted war before
it is able to neutralize its Western front.

The Chinese could

hope to institute the collapse of the Soviet regime along the
lines depicted in Amalrik's scenario.

The Soviets would not

be in a position of moving most of their forces from Eastern
Europe to the Far East and time will work against the Soviets
in a long protracted war with a China being armed by the U.S.
In effect, China could achieve a posture similar to that which
they could realize in twenty years time, but which they feel
the Soviets will move to prevent at a time of their choosing.
The Chinese strategy then is to prevent the Soviets achieving
certain goals in the West, thereby giving the Chinese the
strategic ability to fight a long war with the USSR aiming not
at a decisive military victory but of effecting the collapse
of the regime or at least a retreat by the Soviets geographically
from much of Asia.
The Soviets are well aware of what the Chinese leaders
intend.

The future in fact may become a race between these

two states, and which will realize its strategic goals first.
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the
Kremlin is not likely to pass up the chance presented by the
Soviet "window of opportunity".

Indeed, if hardliners can

convince more moderate elements that their position is as strong
as it appears, and that there is little chance of any significant
U.S. response, then the world perhaps can expect to see imminently
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a war between the Communist giants.

During their "window of

opportunity" the Soviets will have uncontested

all-around

military superiority in Eurasia; they could act during this
opportune time to avert fighting the long protracted war that
they may feel China has planned for them in the future.
Another concern is that if they do have intentions of making
a "grab" for Middle Eastern oil supplies, China could emerge
as their dreaded second

trout.

Also, if Moscow can neutralize

China, it would achieve a period of grace to deal with internal
problems without the extreme external threat that China poses.
The Soviet elite might act to avert a long war in which its
own internal problems could bring about its collapse.

Western

disunity in the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
and the U.S. hostage-taking incident in Tehran, may serve to
convince the Soviets that the process of politically

dominating

and effectively neutralizing Western Europe is well in progress and that China can be taken care of with a minimum of
Western response.

Chapter V:

Conclusion
Do not confuse securite the feeling
of having nothing to fear, and
surete - the state of having
nothing to fear.
Larousse

We have tried to demonstrate that the combination of
long run national pessimism plus short term military

optimism

adds up to the possibility of probable Soviet military expansionism in the 1980s; given the parameters of this "window
of opportunity" Soviet expansionism could be projected to
occur before 1986.

From the outset of this paper we have held

that Soviet foreign behaviour increasingly will be a reaction
to perceived exigencies which threaten the continuation of
what is in fact a Russian empire.
The leadership of this empire, we see as:
Groups seeking self-preservation ...
driven to a foreign policy conflict ...
in order to defend themselves against
the onslaught of domestic rather than
foreign enemies ...1
Even our examination of China does not indicate that China will
be a significant threat without the combination of internal
problems inside the Soviet Union.

The nature of the regime,

a totalitarian system and the noted propensity of such regimes
to use international crises to divert attention from internal
E.B. Haas and A.S. Whiting, Dynamics of International
Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 62.
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2
problems* serves to reinforce our argument that Soviet expansion in the short term is possible and perhaps probable.
We have also noted that for the Soviet Union now not
to seek actively the attenuation of problems (present and
future), would be a departure in foreign behaviour which has
been remarkably consistent whether Tsarist or Soviet.
the combination of lateral pressures and military

Indeed

superiority

has provided circumstances which are highly conducive to the
traditional, historical drive of Moscow's expansionism.
The Soviet leadership perhaps could reasonably expect
to achieve certain goals during this "window": firstly, the
amelioration of critical problems not yet of a crisis proportion, but which can be projected to be so when the "window"
is closing; and secondly, the prospect of defeating U.S.
interests over much of the globe (this might become almost
irresistable for some groups inside the Kremlin).
We now turn our examination to Soviet strategy as
evinced by Soviet moves in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere.

Certain probable targets, some being assailed at

present, and others likely shortly, will be examined and projections based on these trends will be presented in the form
of scenarios focused on the Middle East and China.

Given our

level of analysis these scenarios will be consistent with the
traditional motives for expansion by the Kremlin.
2
B. Farrell, "Foreign Politics of Open and Closed
Political Societies" in Approaches to Comparative and International
Politics, ed. B. Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press,
1966) , p. 185.
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Soviet Global Strategy
Lenin once declared: "The conquest of Europe will take,
place through Africa;" anyone examining Soviet successes in
Africa will note the consistency of Soviet foreign policy with
Lenin's observation sixty years ago.

Indeed, Soviet

foreign

policy in much of the third world indicates that the present
masters inside the Kremlin share Lenin's belief.

The first

formal articulation of Soviet intentions was spelled out at
the Congress of Oriental Nations held at Baku in 1920 under
the aegis of the USSR, where the USSR defined its intentions to
deprive the West of. its raw material sources, thus paralyzing
it.

Since Baku, the West has, in fact, become even more dependent

in terms of oil and raw materials on external resources which
appears consistent with Lenin's' blueprint for crippling it.
For the Soviets to realize a shift in their favour of.
the "correlation of forces" they have to interdict the resources
enroute from Africa and Asia to the West; to do so at the source
is less dangerous than provoking a military confrontation.
The Soviet leaders in the present are as concerned with the
"correlation of forces" as Lenin was.

This "correlation of

forces" may most clearly be explained as consisting of,
... not only those factors which in Western
terminology are included in the concept of
'balance of power' but also economic capabilities,
social stability, and public opinion, i.e.,
elements that, although not military
in the strict sense of the word, nevertheless
have considerable bearing on a nation's
ability to wage war.3
R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," in Commentary
April '80, p. 32.
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Stalin expanded on Lenin's plan to alter the "correlation of forces" radically in 1921 when he stated:
If Europe and America may be called the
front, the non-sovereign nations and
colonies, with their raw materials, fuel,
food, and vast stores of human material,
should be regarded as the rear, the
reserve of imperialism.
In order to win
a war one must not only triumph at the
front but also revolutionize the enemy's
rear, his reserves.^
Nixon, in The Real War, warns that the present Soviet
leadership continues to implement the strategy of Lenin and
Stalin.

He recounts that Soviet President Brezhnev confided

to Siad Barre, the President of Somalia (at the time an important
ally in Africa) "our aim is to gain control of the two great
treasure houses on which the west depends - the energy treasure
house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of
central and southern Africa."
Nixon points out that we are in a period in which the
Soviets are fighting us (and winning) in a massive global Third
World War, where the U.S. is the chief rival opposing Soviet
world hegemony.

Western Europe and Japan are intermediate

targets; the war is being fought presently in areas of Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East, also Latin America.

The Soviets

are risking little but gaining key strategic advantages.
Richard Pipes notes that the Kremlin needs to reduce
Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books,
1980), p. 23.
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America in the same way Rome had to eliminate Carthage

to be

in an unrivalled position in the international system of that
time.

Because of the U.S. strategic arsenal, a direct assault

is not as preferable as an indirect assault on the power of
the U.S.. The Soviet aim is to,
... detach Europe and Japan from the U.S.
and pull them into the Soviet orbit: the
addition of Western Europe's and Japan's
industrial capabilities to those of the
Soviet bloc would alter immediately and in
a most dramatic manner the global correlation of forces in the latter's favour.'
Pipes uses another analogy to demonstrate the Soviet strategic
plan: he compares the manner in which medieval castles were
blockaded, prior to the introduction of gunpowder, to the
Soviet "systematic effort to cut

off the flow of reinforcements

Q

and supplies"

to Western Europe and Japan.

The Soviet strategy

being to eventually interdict the "reinforcements of manpower
and materials from the U.S., and supplies in the form of fuel
9
and metals from the Middle East and South Africa."
The massive
Soviet build-up of a blue water, capability navy can be understood in terms of the strategic aims of the Kremlin.
Nine-tenths of U.S. war supplies to the
European fronts would have to travel by sea,
so that serious Soviet threat to the North
Atlantic sea lanes would be bound to have
significant repercussions on the progress
of European operations.10
R. Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," op. cit., p. 36.
Ibid . , p. 36.
8 Ibid., p. 37.
Ibid. , p. 37.
10

Ibid . , p. 37.
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Nixon observes that "if the USSR continues to succeed
in its penetration of Africa, it will have come a long way in
its larger strategy of encircling the world

'city' - of

cutting off the industrialized West from the resources without
which it cannot survive."
The Kremlin may feel its highest priority target to
be the Persian Gulf for two good reasons: (1) the desirability
acquiring inexpensive oil (2) the potential denial of the
region's oil to Japan and Western Europe would enable the
Soviets to neutralize the allies of the U.S., thereby isolating
the U.S.
Directed toward these ends, the Kremlin has been
positioning Soviet forces at principal choke points through
which Gulf oil is transported to Japan and Europe.

From its

new access to naval bases in Viet Nam, the Soviets are in
position to reach the Straits of Malacca, the major route for
oil enroute to Japan.

Soviet bases in South Yemen and Ethiopia

are in place to interdict the Straits of Bab el Mandel which
guard the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

The

recent invasion of Afghanistan brought Soviet forces a hundred
percent closer (550 kilometers compared to 1100) to the crucial
Straits of Hormuz.
Political control over the Gulf region by the Soviets
would represent a massive shift in the "correlation of forces."
Soviet political control over the Gulf would result in severe
political and economic pressures being brought to bear on the
11 R. Nixon, The Real War, op. cit., p. 24
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U.S.'s allies: Japan, Britain, the European Community nations,
resulting probably in their loosening their ties to NATO.
Africa is of almost equal importance if not in the
short term certainly in the long run plans of the Kremlin for
bringing down the Capitalist system.

From their successes in

Angola and Mozambique, represented by friendship treaties, they
threaten "the whole of what Brezhnev so covetously referred to
as the 'mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa'.
Just as the Soviets had their eyes on the oil of Arabia when
they moved into Somalia and then Ethiopia, they had their
eyes on these mineral resources when they moved into Angola
and Mozambique."

12

Japan and Europe are dependent on minerals such as
chrome, platinum, vanadium, and manganese from Zimbabwe, and
southern Africa, including Namibia and the Union of South Afric
Soviet support of liberation groups in these countries is
directed certainly towards interrupting at some point these
resources so vital to the West.
The U.S. itself, while not crucially dependent on oil
supplies from the Gulf, is heavily dependent on minerals from
southern Africa.
industries.

Chromium is a key resource for U.S. defense

The U.S. has to import more than 90% of this

mineral; the biggest exporter to the U.S. of chrome is South
Africa, which has 96% of the worlds known reserves together
with Zimbabwe.

13

The USSR would enhance its position vis a. vis

the global "correlation of forces" just by cutting off this
12
Richard Nixon, The Real War, op. cit., p. 28.
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resource permanently to the U.S.

Tactics
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a good indication
that the long term strategy of shifting in their favour the
"correlation of forces" takes precedence over grain supplies,
advanced

technology and cheap credit from the West, which

alleviates the inefficiencies of the Soviet economic

system.

For the masters of the Kremlin to pull off the plan formalized
at Baku in 1920 they must act while the balance of forces is
most favourable to them.

The invasion of Afghanistan puts them

that much closer to a position from which they can cripple the
economies of Japan and West Europe and weaken that of the U.S.:
by interrupting the flow of oil supplies from the Middle East.
The Soviets have removed Afghanistan as a "buffer"
state between Soviet armed forces and the West's vital oil lanes.
The takeover of Afghanistan places the USSR one country closer
to achieving a long sought g o a l — a warm water port on the Arabian
Sea.

From such a port the Soviets could exert almost

irresistabl

political coercion over the nations of the Gulf, and if the
occasion warrants, military interdiction of the flow of oil.
Former President Nixon warns that the invasion was part
of a p at tern:
It is a pattern of ceaseless building by the
Soviets toward a position of overwhelming
military force, while using subversion and
proxy troops, and now even its own, to take
over one country after another, until they
are in a position to conquer or Finlandize
the world.14
14 R. Nixon, The Real War, op. cit., p. 12

It is interesting to note that many of the Soviet
invasion troops in Afghanistan are on the Western border facing
Iran, "far from the counter-insurgency operations in the North,
East and central regions.

The biggest military airbase in

Afghanistan has been established at Shindand (near the border
with Iran) where four strike air squadrons and some 60 MI-60
transport helicopters are based."

Soviet expansion at Iran's

expense, given its weakened armed forces and the dubious nature
of a U.S. response, can be seen as a real probability.

The

Soviet Union has been quick to present nationalities claims
as a pretext for expansion, in the recent past.

Certainly

"there are still large numbers of Azerbaidzhanis and other
national minorities under Tehran rule who could form the basis
for demands to extend the Soviet frontier, despite Lenin's
repudiation of Tsarist conquests."
Perhaps the more likely basis of any Soviet military
intervention in Iran by the Soviet Union could be the invocation of the 1921 Friendship Treaty.

The Soviet Union has

invoked article 6, which provides for Soviet military intervention, before in Iran (i.e., the partial occupation of Iran
in 1941), and "any third party threatening the independence of
Iran and the security of the USSR,"

justifies Soviet action.

15„ Moscow Exploits Iran Crisis," in Soviet Analyst
Vol. 9 #8, April 16 '80, p. 1
Ibid . , p. 2
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It is easy to imagine several plausible

scenarios

whereby the USSR could invoke this clause, thereby legitimizing Soviet expansion at the expense of Iran.

Two in

particular are: (1) a U.S. military action against Iran in
connection with the hostages; (2) an attack on Iran by Iraq
(with the approval and support of the USSR).

In either

eventuality the Soviets have positioned themselves to intercede "56,000 Soviet combat troops backed up with 850 tanks and
1,660 armored personnel carriers now reported on Afghanistan's
western border"

18

facing Iran.

It is likely that the lack of a concerted Western
response over their invasion of Afghanistan is serving to
support the advocation by hardliners in the Kremlin that the
time is ripe for the "liberation" of Iran from external aggression.

Russian regimes, whether Tsarist or Soviet, are not noted

for their propensity to let opportune occasions for expansion
to elude them.
Soviet intentions regarding Saudi Arabia are no secret
to the Saudis.

As Nixon warns:

Saudi Arabia is threatened: The Horn of
Africa forms a claw with its pincers
around the Arabian peninsula; the
Ethiopian highlands look down menacingly
on the desert sands of Saudi Arabia,
just across the Red Sea.19
Soviet moves in both the Horn and in South Yemen have
convinced the Saudis that Soviet intentions are to exert
18„

Moscow Exploits Iran Crisis," op. cit., p. 1.

19 R. Nixon, The Real War, op. cit., p. 27
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political pressure on the kingdom, with the goal of transforming
the kingdom into a people's republic, with a pro-Soviet
orientation.

The crisis in short term Soviet energy pro-

duction makes Saudi oil a very attractive prize.

What the

Saudis and Western nations dependent on Saudi oil fear is a
Soviet-backed coup, resulting in the kingdom and its resources
joining the Soviet led East European economic system.
The Saudis have resisted normalizing relations with the
USSR with this real fear in their minds, however, apparent
Western weakness in the face of Soviet successes in South Yemen
and the Horn, could lead to the Saudis being forced to normalize
their relations with the Kremlin.

Such a course would be

embarked on with the hope of thwarting an immediate threat
from the Soviet Union.

Such a change in Saudi foreign policy,

induced by Soviet adventurism in the region, would strike a
hard tactical blow at the West.
Africa has seen the Soviets make gains at the expense
of the West, virtually unopposed.

Angola alone was a significant

chess piece taken from the West in the global game of chess.
The Soviets have access now to the vast mineral resources, the
oil of Cabinda, but equally important are in a position to cut
off these resources to the West.

From naval and air bases in

Angola, the Soviets can patrol the southern Atlantic, cutting
off supplies of oil and minerals at will, bound for Europe.
Africa offers still more attractive targets for the
Soviets, particularly Nigeria (oil), South Africa

(gold,
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uranium, rare metals), and Zaire (cobalt, manganese,copper).

20

The Soviets, through their facilities already in place,
have a tactical advantage over the U.S. in terms of further
intervention at the expense of the U.S. and its allies.

"The

combined effects of regional changes, the Soviet Union's own
growth in military capacity for regional intervention, and the
U.S. post-Viet Nam wariness about military responses and intervention make Soviet interventions easier."

21

Given these developments, the Soviet plan formulated
at Baku in 1920 appears to be near completion.

The Soviet

Union would be in a position to control practically the whole
of Black Africa, in the event of a war with the West; this is
a significant tactical advantage.

The Soviets could reasonably

hope to be able to choke the West into submission by denying
the oil and resources needed to wage war.

As one observer

noted ominously:
Every 20 minutes 50,000 tons of oil is
shipped along the Cape route. Is the
USSR to achieve definitive control of
this route vital to the West?22
The importance of Africa cannot be underestimated, if
"the Soviets one day were to control it and her inexhaustible
mineral resources, they would be unquestionably masters of the
20
H. Bienen, "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in
Africa," Political Science Quarterly, p. 39.
21 Ibid . , p. 36 .
22

A . Coste-Floret, "The Great Design of the U.S.S.R,
in Africa," in Atlantic Community Quarterly, p. 275.
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world economy, while at the same time it would be easy for
them to cut Western lines of communication."

23

Soviet moves in Africa represent the battles being
fought by the USSR against the U.S. for hegemony over Europe-a war that has seen the USSR acquire tactical advantages virtually unopposed by its rival, the U.S.

Possible
(I)

Scenarios

Middle East
Given that the Kremlin is aware that it need not invade

militarily Western Europe to gain control over it, a war
between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is not likely in the 1980s
(indeed if it ever w a s ) .

The Soviets merely have to acquire

control over the Persian Gulf to control Western Europe.

To

that end, it is probable that the Kremlin has a plan which
would provide for the acquisition of free oil and secondly,
the political gains to be had from such a move, i.e. military
intervention in the Gulf.
A quick move through Northern Iran to an occupation of
Iranian oil fields, and possibly other Persian Gulf fields,
including those of Iraq, would give the Soviet Union the leverage
to put heavy political pressure on Western Europe and Japan.
This move by the Soviets could -easily be the result of several
opportunities (some already discussed) but one is increasingly
probable--that of the death of Khomeini producing a collapse of
authority in Iran.

The Soviets, of course, would be Invited

23
A. Coste-Floret, "The Great Design of the U.S.S.R. in
Africa," op. cit., p. 275.
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in by any of several sources inside Iran, similar to the
request by Amin in Afghanistan for Soviet help.

The U.S. would

not be in a position to threaten to escalate the conflict by
using nuclear forces with any great deal of confidence.

The

U.S., while it is strategically vulnerable to a first strike,
cannot afford to see the conflict escalate to the brink.

The

use of American paratroopers would be futile without the support
of armour.

The Soviets, by threatening to interdict oil supplies

to West Europe and Japan, can reasonably expect these nations
to stay out of the limited war which could ensue between the
USSR and the U.S.
The USSR might avoid occupying Saudi Arabia, thereby
leaving the U.S. the facesaving gesture of occupying it under
the rationale of preventing further Soviet advancement.
The Soviets would then have achieved significant
in terms of self-aggrandizement

results

at the expense of the U.S.-- -

such as: (1) the breakup of NATO; (2) the isolation of the U.S.
to North America; (3) securing Soviet Western borders in the
event of a war in the east with China; (4) the means to exert
political changes in West Europe and Japan, such as moving
Communist party members into cabinet decision making, the
eventual result being the transformation of these nations into
'Peoples' Republics'; (5) time and resources to overcome
economic dislocations inside the Soviet Union; (6) probable
long term security and stability for their empire.
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II

China
A move by the Kremlin against China is probably heavily

dependent on the success of the first scenario, at least in
some similar manner.

The possibility exists that China could

induce a Soviet attack before Moscow is able to secure its
western border, but in lieu of that the following scenario is
pos sible .
The Kremlin worried that China for any of several reasons
might provoke a war in the future; a Kremlin well aware that
Japanese and Western help hastens the day when the Chinese could
fight such a war on comparable t e r m s — w i l l decide to act against
China while the "correlation of forces" is in its favour.-

The

Kremlin moves to take care of China before a real alliance can
emerge between an alarmed West, a fearful Japan, and a hostile
China.

If the Soviets were to pull off the partial neutrali-

zation of West Europe and Japan, they could probably enhance
this process by the reduction of China.
The Kremlin acting during its "window of opportunity"
may not hesitate to use a preemptive nuclear strike on China,
followed by the "balkanization" of China.

The Soviets, with

quick armored thrusts, could "liberate" Sinkiang, Manchuria,
inner Mongolia, perhaps Tibet.

The rest of China would then

be offset by client regimes of the USSR.
The reduction of China would provide the period of
grace the Kremlin needs to deal with its internal problems;
without this period of grace, the regime could collapse internally,
given a long war with China and the West.
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We present these scenarios not as an exercise in
crystal ball gazing, but rather to point out that such possibilities are actual options available to the Kremlin during its
transitory advantage over the United States.
Summary
The conclusions we must draw from our analysis are truly
alarming.

The arguments of Nixon, Pipes, Luttwak, Nitze, and

Rostow which we sought to strengthen and support by incorporating them with an examination of "lateral pressures" indicates
that the true gravity of the situation, for the West, is even
more dangerous than any of these publicists singularly points
out.

Indeed, we see the probability that the Kremlin will act

on the same basis as it does in General Hackett's scenario for
the 3rd World War, where short term military optimism and long
term national pessimism leads the Soviet leadership to war.
We disagree however with his venue; Soviet military expansion is
more likely to occur in the Middle East and Far East where the
risks will be less and the results about the same.

In short,

we see the Soviet elite embarking on a plan which could lead
it to eventual world hegemony, and the maintenance of the Russian
empire in the face of the most potent ideology of the 20th
century, "nationalism".

Appendix
We would like to sketch briefly Choucri's and North's
argument

of how lateral pressures lead to conflict in foreign

policy behaviour, in order to see if our historical analysis
of what we feel to be increasing lateral pressures corresponds to their model, thus perhaps serving to support our
analysis of probable trends in Soviet foreign behaviour in
the '80s.
In their model they argue that leaders operate to
minimize shortages such as resources needed, gaps between expectations and realizations when climbing productivity tapers
off, and the gap between the resource or growth rate of one's
own country and that of a competitor.

Further, they point

out that the combination of a growing population and developing technology will place rapidly increasing demands upon the
nation's resources, which will result in internally-generated
pressures.

The more this pressure increases, the more likely

leaders will seek to extend national activities beyond the
country's borders.

When a state intersects with another of

similar high capability in extending their national interests,
there is a strong probability that the competition will assume
military dimensions.

They see major wars emerging through a

two-step process: internally generated pressures, and, secondly,
reciprocal comparison.

Therefore the internal demands of the

N. Choucri, and R. North, "Dynamics of International
Conflict," in R. Tanter and R. Ullman (eds.) Theory and Policy
in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,
1972).
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society combine multiplicatively to produce what are termed
"lateral pressures."

They see leaders pressured to undertake

activities increasingly removed from the original boundaries
of the society, and that empires with high lateral pressures
will tend to extend their influence in search of raw materials.
The greater the lateral pressures generated within this state
or empire, the greater the tendency will be to push its
interests into territories and states with lower levels of
capability.
in

They see the desire to protect national interests

far-off areas leading to wars against

societies.

low-capability

When two states of high capabilities and high

lateral pressure tendencies extend their interests and psychopolitical borders outward, there is a strong probability that
sooner or later the opposing perimeters of interest will
intersect at one or more points.

They argue, there is often

the feeling on the part of the aspiring, but still weaker power,
that it is being "encircled" by rivals.

When this happens,

they see the competition becoming more serious.

They see the

competition leading to non-violent conflict, or to an arms
race, which increases the chances of war.

Choucri and North

posit a continuum from one set of dynamics to another

(separated

by break points): expansion to competition to crisis to war.

2

In our analysis we find that lateral pressure is exerted
on the Soviet elite with respect to the "Legitimacy Problem"
because the CPSU has no mandate to govern unless it can
N. Choucri and R.C. North, "Dynamics of International
Conflict," op. cit.
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continue to pass itself off as the vanguard of the revolution.
Further, that it must carry the conflict and struggle to other
states with the appearance of winning.

We therefore find the

regime must continue to create an atmosphere of tension
internationally.

The Soviet elite must maintain this posture

in order to have a basis for its de^ facto role of imperial
master in Eastern Europe and of the non-Russian nationalities
inside the Soviet Union.

Under increasing pressure the Soviet

elite are forced to seek external expansionism, the historic
course of Tsarist governments seeking to secure the empire.
Thus the Soviet elite are under lateral pressure to create
... a world from which private property
in the means of production has been banished
and the constituent states are, with minor
variation, copies of the Soviet state. It
is only in a world so fashioned that the
elite ruling Soviet Russia would feel secure
and comfortable.3
Economic factors leading to lateral pressures are caused
by two factors, primarily

(1) a scarcity of energy resources

in the 1980s and (2) the inability to liberalize the system.
The Choucri-North model appears to be applicable to the
Soviet Union heading into the 1980s.

Its leaders are con-

fronted with a gap in available resources (i.e. their short
term energy crisis) to its real rival the United States and its
interests are intersecting with those of China in Asia.

The

competition between the Communist giants could easily assume
3
Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," in Commentary,
April 1980, p. 33.
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military dimensions.

It is possible that the Soviet elite

will move to a war with China based both on internally
generated pressures, and on a reciprocal comparison of what
China will be in the future.

Bibliography
Books
Amalrik, A. Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?
Harper and Row, 1970.

New York:

Aspaturian, V.V. Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy.
Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971.
Brown, Neville. The Future Global Challenge.
and Company Inc., 1977.

New York: Russak

Cohen, Saul B. Geography and Politics in a World Divided.
New York: Random House, 1975.
Conquest, R. Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practise.
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967.
Edmonds, R. Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-1973.
University Press, 1975.

New

London: Oxford

Hazard, John H. The Soviet System of Government.
The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Chicago:

Haugh, Jerry F. and Merle Fainsod. How the Soviet Union is
Governed.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
Jacobsen, C. Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy.
Glasgow: Robert Maclehose & Co. Ltd., 1972.
Janis. I.L. Victims of Groupthink.
Company, 19 7 2.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Larson, T.B. Soviet American Rivalry.
& Co. Inc. , 1978.
Nixon, Richard.
1980.
Nove, A.

The Real War.

The Soviet Economy.

New York: W.W. Norton

New York: Warner Books Inc.,
New York: Praeger Pub., 1961.

. An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.
The Penguin Press, 1969.

London:

Pipes, R. "Detente: Moscow's View." ed. R. Pipes. Soviet
Strategy in Europe. New York: Crane, Russak & Co.
Inc., 1976.
Reshetar, John S. The Soviet Policy.
& Co., 1971.

Toronto: Dodd, Mead

Salisbury, Harrison E. War Between Russia and China.
New York: Bantam, 1969.
95

96
Schwartz, M. The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R. Domestic
Factors. Riverside: Dickenson Pub. Co., 1975.
Smith, Hedrick.
1976.

The Russ ians.

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander I.
Harper & Row, 1978.

New York: Ballantine Books,

A World Split Apart.

Triska, S.F.
Soviet Foreign Policy.
Company, 1968.
Tzu,

Sun. The Art of War.
1963.

Ulam, A.

New York:

New York: The Macmillan

London: Oxford University Press,

Expansion and Coexistence.

New York: Praeger, 1975.

Weeks, A.L. The Other Side of Coexistence.
Pitman, 1970.
Wesson, R. The Russian Dilemma.
Press, 1974.

New York:

New Jersey: Rutgers University

Wilkenfeld, J. (ed.) Conflict Behaviour and Linkage Politics.
New York: David McKay Co., 1973.

Amalric, Jacques. "The Soviet Union at 60."
Press Review, Feb. '78, p. 20.
Apalin, G. "Peking, The West and Detente."
Affairs (Moscow), Feb. '79.

Atlas World
International

Aron, Raymond.
"From American Imperialism to Soviet Hegemonism."
The Atlantic Monthly Quarterly, Winter 79-80.
Aspaturian, Vernon V. "The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union."
Rosenau, James N., Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd,
(eds.). World Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1976.
. "Soviet Foreign Policy." in Macridis,
Roy C., (ed.). Foreign Policy in World Politics.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976.
Berliner, Joseph and Franklyn D. Holzman. "The Soviet Economy:
Domestic and Internal Issues." Griffith, William E.,
(ed.). The Soviet Empire: Expansion & Detente.
Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976.

97
Bialer, Seweryn. "The Soviet Political Elite and Internal
Developments in the USSR." Griffith, William E.,
(ed.) . The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente.
Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976.
Biener, H. "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa."
Political Science Quarterly.
Black, Cyril E. "The Pattern of Russian Objectives."
Lederer, I.J. (ed.). Russian Foreign Policy.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "From Cold War to Cold Peace." in
Urban, G.R., (ed.). Detente. New York: Universe Books,
1976.
Choucri, Nazli, and Robert C. North. "Dynamics of International
Conflict." in Tanter, Raymond and Richard H. Ullman
(eds.). Theory and Policy in International Relations.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
Clem, Ralph S. "Recent Demographic Trends Among Soviet
Nationalities and Their Implications." in Simmonds,
George W. (ed.). Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern
Europe. Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977.
Cobb, Tyrus.

"The Soviet Energy Dilemma." Orbis, Summer of '79.

Cohen, Stephen F. "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism
and Conservatism in the Soviet Union." in Cohen,
Rabinowitch and Sharlet, (eds.). The Soviet Union
Since S talin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1980.
Conquest, Robert. "Why the Soviet Elite is Different From Us."
Atlantic Monthly Quarterly. Vol. 16 No. 1.
Coste-Floret, A. "The Great Design of the USSR in Africa."
Atlantic Community Quarterly. Fall '79.
Dallin, Alexander. "Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics
A Framework for Analysis." Hoffman, Erik P. and Frederi
J. Fleron, Jr., (eds.). The Conduct of Soviet Foreign
Policy . Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971.
FitzGerald, S. "China - A Stabilizing Force."
Quarterly. Volume 17.

Atlantic Monthly

Gati, Charles. "The Stalinist Legacy in Soviet Foreign Policy."
Cohen, Rabinowitch and Sharlet, (eds.) The Soviet Union
Since Stalin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1980.

98
Goure, D. and Gordon H. McCormick, "Soviet Strategic Defense:
The Neglected Dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Balance."
Orbis, Spring '80.
Gray, Colin S. "The 'Racing' Syndrome and the Strategic Balance."
Whetten, Lawrence L. (ed.). The Future of Soviet
Military Power. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.,
1976.
Gray, C.S., and Payne, K. "Victory is Possible."
Policy #39, Summer of '80.

Foreign

Halsti, Wolf H. "Finlandization." Urban, G.R. (ed.), Detente.
New York: Universe Books, 1976).
Harmstone, Teresta Rakowska. "The Dilemma of Nationalism in
the Soviet Union." Strong, John W. e d . ) . The Soviet
Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin. New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971.
. "The Study of Ethnic Politics in
the USSR." in Simmonds, George W., (ed.). Nationalism
in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Detroit: University of
Detroit Press, 1977.
. "Nationalism in Soviet Central
Asia Since 1964." Simmonds, George W. (ed.) Nat ionalism
in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Detroit: University of
Detroit Press, 1977.
Hoffman, Erik P. "Changing Soviet Perspectives on Leadership
and Administration."
Cohen, Rabinowitch and Sharlet,
(eds.), The Soviet Union Since Stalin. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1980.
Jones, W.M.
"Soviet Leadership Politics and Leadership Views
on the Use of Military Force." Rand, July '79.
Kahler, M. "Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy."
Vol. 58, No. 2, Winter 79/80.
Kintner, William.
Powers.'"

Foreign Affairs,

"A Strategic Triangle of 'Two and a Half
Orbis, Fall of '79, Vol. 23.

Kuzmin, W. "China in Washington's Aggressive Policy."
International Affairs (Moscow), April '80.
Laird, Roy D. "The Politics of Soviet Agriculture." Nogee,
Joseph L. (ed.). Man, State, and Society in the Soviet
Union. New York: Praeger, 1972.
Lowenthal, Richard.
"Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy."
Strong,
John W. (ed.), The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and
Kosygin. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company,
1971.

99
Luttwak, Edward. "After Afghanistan, What?." Commentary,
April, 1980.
Meyer, H.E., "Why We Should Worry About The Soviet Energy Crunch?"
Fo rtune Magazine, Feb. 25, 1980.
Mitchell, R.J. "The Soviet Succession." Orbis, Spring '79.
Nitze, P.H.
"Assuming Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente."
Foreign Affairs Vol. 54 #2, Jan. '76.
"Deterring Our Deterrent." Foreign Policy, Winter
76-77
Osgoode, Robert. ."The East-West Global Equilibrium." Atlantic
Community Quarterly.
Summer '79.
L"No Author! . "Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance
with Imperialism." International Affairs (Moscow), March
1980.
Pipes, Richard. "Solving The Nationality Problem."
in Nogee,
Joseph L. (ed.). Man, State, and Society in the Soviet
Union. New York: Praeger, 1972.
. "Detente and Reciprocity." Urban, G.R.
Detente . New York: Universe Books, 1976.
.

"Soviet Global Strategy."

(ed.).

Commentary, April /80

"Domestic Politics and Foreign Affairs."
Lederer, I.J. (ed.). Russian Foreign Policy. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962.
Robinson, Thomas W. "Soviet Policy in Asia." Griffith, William
E. The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente. Lexington:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1976.
Rostow, Eugene. "The Case Against SALT II." Commentary,
Feb. 1979.
Scowcroft, Brent. "A Military Report."
Quarterly. Winter 79-80.

Atlantic Community

Semyono, Y. "Peking's Policy Constitutes A Military Threat."
International Affairs (Moscow) April '79.
Shulman, Marshall D. "Transformations in the Soviet System."
Nogee, Joseph L. (ed.), Man, State, and Society in the
Soviet Union. New York: Praeger, 1972.
Simes, Dimitri. "Detente, Russian Style."
No. 31-33.

Foreign Policy.

Smolansky, Oles M. "The Soviet Union and the Middle East."
Griffith, William' E. (ed.). The Soviet Empire: Expansion
& Detente. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976.

100
Solhenitsyn, A. "The West's Decline in Courage." Atlantic
Community Quarterly. Fall 1978, Vol. 16 #3.
Ulam, Adam B. "Nationalism, Panslavism, Communism." Lederer,
I.J. (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1962.
. "Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy." Hoffman,
Erik P. and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., (eds.), The
Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicago: Aldine.
Atherton, 1971.
. "Why The Status quo in Eastern Europe is a
Threat to Soviet Security." Urban G.R. (ed) . Detente .
New York: Universe Books, 1976.
Van Cleave, William R.
"Soviet Doctrine and Strategy:
A Developing American View." Whetten, Lawrence L.,
(ed.). The Future of Soviet Military Power. New York:
Crane, Russak & Company Inc., 1976.
Vernon, J.
"Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of
Peaceful Coexistence." Orbis , Summer of '79, Vol. 23
No . 2.
Wessell, Nils.
"Soviet views of Multipolarity and the Emerging
Balance of Power." Orbis, Winter of '79.
Whetten, Lawrence L. "Introduction: Doctrine, Strategy,
Capabilities and Overview." Whetten, Lawrence L. (ed.).
The Future of Soviet Military Power. New York: Crane,
Russak & Company, Inc.,- 1976.
Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. "Domestic and Foreign Conflict."
Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, (ed.). Conflict Behavior and
Linkage Politics. New York: David McKay Company,
Inc., 1973.
, and Dina A. Zinnes. "A Linkage Model
of Domestic Conflict Behavior." Wilkenfeld, Jonathan,
(ed.) , Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics.
New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973.
Wright, Arthur W. "Soviet Economic Planning and Performance."
Cohen, Rabinowitch and Sharlet, (eds.) The Soviet
Union Since Stalin. Bliimongton: Indiana Univ. Press,
1980.
Zimmerman, William.
"Elite Perspectives and the Expansion of
Soviet Foreign Policy." Hoffman, Erik P., and
Frederic J. Fleron Jr., (eds.). The Conduct of Soviet
Foreign Policy. Chicago: Aldine. Atherton, 1971.

